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SYNOPSIS
In this report, we examine foreclosure trends in the subprime market and provide the first 
comprehensive assessment of how homeowners have fared in the fast-growing subprime mortgage
market. Our research analyzes the performance of more than six million subprime mortgages from
1998 through 2004 and projects lifetime cumulative subprime foreclosure rates for each annual
cohort of subprime loans from 1998 through 2006. We investigate patterns of subprime foreclo-
sures and, based on housing appreciation forecasts from Moody’s Economy.com, project subprime
foreclosure rates and losses for homeowners. 
Our results show that despite low interest rates and a favorable economic environment during the
past several years, the subprime market has experienced high foreclosure rates comparable to the
worst foreclosure experience ever in the modern prime market. We also show that foreclosure rates
will increase significantly in many markets as housing appreciation slows or reverses. As a result,
we project that 2.2 million borrowers will lose their homes and up to $164 billion of wealth in the
process. Further, we find that many features of typical subprime loans substantially increase the risk
of foreclosure, regardless of the borrower’s credit history.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this report, the Center for Responsible Lending presents research on how homeowners have fared
with subprime mortgages. Analyzing the performance of more than six million subprime mortgages
made from 1998 through the third quarter of 2006 and taking into account changes in housing
prices, we find that foreclosure risk in the subprime market has escalated in recent years, and is 
likely to grow even worse in many areas.  
As this year ends, 2.2 million households in the subprime market either have lost their 
homes to foreclosure or hold subprime mortgages that will fail over the next several years. 
These foreclosures will cost homeowners as much as $164 billion, primarily in lost home equity. 
We project that one out of five (19 percent) subprime mortgages originated during the past two
years will end in foreclosure. This rate is nearly double the projected rate of subprime loans made in
2002, and it exceeds the worst foreclosure experience in the modern mortgage market, which
occurred during the “Oil Patch” disaster of the 1980s. 
In brief, these are the primary findings:
1. Even during the recent period of strong housing appreciation, subprime foreclosures have
been high. As many as one in eight (13 percent) subprime home loans ended in foreclosure within
five years of origination. 
2. The past housing boom masked the high proportion of homeowners who have struggled with 
subprime loans. For many borrowers, strong house price growth increased the amount of equity in
their homes and enabled them to refinance their mortgages despite being behind on the monthly
payments. When these distressed prepayments are added to the foreclosure rates, the total “failure
rate”  for subprime loans approaches 25 percent.
Key Findings
• 2.2 million subprime home loans made in recent years have already failed or will end 
in foreclosure. 
• These foreclosures will cost homeowners as much as $164 billion.
• One out of five subprime mortgages originated during the past two years will end 
in foreclosure.
About this Research
Our study projects foreclosures on subprime home loans made nationwide during each 
year from 1998 through 2006, and measures the effects of housing appreciation on loan 
performance. We estimate future foreclosure rates using housing appreciation forecasts 
developed by Moody’s Economy.com, and predict subprime foreclosure rates in all major
metropolitan areas in the United States. The study also examines factors associated 
with subprime foreclosures, including high-risk features typically included in subprime 
home loans.
3. As housing prices decline, subprime foreclosures will rise. Now that the housing boom has
cooled, fewer delinquent borrowers will have the equity needed to refinance their loan or sell their
home to avoid foreclosure. Our results confirm that foreclosures are more likely in housing markets
with lower house price growth. 
4. The chance of foreclosure on a subprime loan doubled between 2002 and 2005. Subprime
loans originated in 2002 have a one-in-ten lifetime chance of foreclosing. For loans originated in
2005 and 2006, the probability shoots up to one in five. 
5. Multiple subprime loans boost foreclosure risk even higher. Lenders often portray subprime
loans as a stepping-stone to a prime loan. In reality, many borrowers in the subprime market refi-
nance from one subprime loan to another, losing equity each time to cover the cost of getting a new
loan. When we analyze the likelihood of foreclosure for borrowers who repeatedly refinance, we find
that the risk of losing the home climbs to 36 percent. While more research is needed, this estimate
relies on assumptions drawn directly from refinance patterns in the subprime market. 
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Why Subprime Foreclosures Matter
The report describes the first comprehensive
research on foreclosures in the subprime 
market, assessing how frequently subprime
mortgages fail and the associated costs to
homeowners. The loss of home equity is 
significant because, for most families, the
value of this ownership is their greatest 
financial asset. The performance of the 
subprime market is significant because it has
rapidly grown from a niche market into a
major economic force, now representing
roughly one quarter of all home loans made
in the United States.  
Our research shows that subprime foreclosure
levels have been extraordinarily high even
during the recent past. As housing apprecia-
tion slows, subprime foreclosures will rise
even higher in the future. The losses will
inevitably have ripple effects throughout the
economy and our society as over two million
families lose their physical shelter, their
major source of financial security, and the
social benefits of homeownership.
Increased Foreclosure Rates Will
Adversely Affect Communities
Increased foreclosures will have an adverse
impact on many local markets and specific
communities.
Problem Markets. Real estate markets that
have experienced high housing appreciation
in recent years will see a marked increase 
in subprime foreclosures as housing prices 
cool. In fact, increases in subprime foreclo-
sures will be the norm. Using recent
Moody’s Economy.com housing apprecia-
tion forecasts, we show projected subprime
foreclosure rates in every major metropoli-
tan statistical area in the U.S. Our data
show that cities in California, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York and Michigan, as well as
the greater Washington, D.C. area, can
expect a high rate of subprime foreclosures.
Vulnerable Homeowners. It is beyond 
the scope of our study to analyze racial 
disparities related to subprime foreclosures.
However, the loss of equity resulting from
subprime foreclosures will affect a great
many African American and Latino 
homeowners, since these communities
receive a disproportionate share of 
subprime home loans.
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Subprime Loans Inherently Pose Higher Risk of Default
Subprime loans are riskier in and of themselves, not just because the borrowers may have weaker
credit. Borrowers who are already financially vulnerable are receiving loans known to pose a higher
risk of default. 
The following factors contribute to subprime foreclosures:
Risky Loans. Subprime mortgages routinely include features that increase the risk of foreclosure.
Such features include adjustable interest rates, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and loans
with limited documentation of borrowers’ loan qualifications. We note that the dominant type of
subprime loan today is an adjustable-rate mortgage called a “2/28” that features semi-annual interest
rate adjustments after a two-year fixed-rate period. The initial fixed rate is often a discounted or
“teaser” rate, so the rate adjustment can lead to a significantly higher payment. Because of the
resulting payment shock, these loans are sometimes referred to as “exploding ARMs.” 
We also note an increasing share of loan products in the subprime market that limit the amount of
equity a borrower builds. These loans also carry a high risk of payment shock and may limit home-
owners’ ability to acquire the equity needed to refinance out of an unaffordable loan.
Loose Underwriting. Lax underwriting standards magnify the risk of loans that already include high-
risk features. Subprime lenders who market exploding ARMs and other high-risk loans often do not
adequately consider whether the homeowner will be able to pay when the loan’s interest rate resets,
even if rates stay constant. Lenders escalate the risk of foreclosure even further when they fail to
require escrow for the cost of property taxes and hazard insurance, and when they approve loans
without verifying the borrower’s income and employment. 
Predatory Lending. This report does not attempt to measure how predatory lending may contribute
to subprime foreclosures, but we make several points that suggest predatory practices may play a
large role: In recent years, more subprime lenders with significant market share have been successful-
ly prosecuted for predatory lending activities. In addition, high-risk loan products and terms, so
common in the subprime market, make it easier for unscrupulous lenders to entice borrowers with a
low initial payment, regardless of whether the borrower can manage future payments. Costly fees
and prepayment penalties associated with predatory loans also strip equity, making it harder for 
borrowers to refinance and forcing them into foreclosure more quickly. We also note reports of
increasing problems associated with foreclosure “rescue” scams.
Third-Party Originators/Lack of Accountability. Mortgage brokers, who originate the majority of
subprime mortgages, have a strong incentive to close as many loans as possible, but very little reason
to consider the loans’ future performance. Lenders shield themselves from the full potential cost of
foreclosures by selling their loans to investors through the secondary mortgage market. Together,
third-party originations and the risk dispersion made possible through the secondary market help
distance loan originators from seriously adverse consequences of foreclosures.
Inadequate Oversight. Today there are insufficient legal and regulatory consequences for making
home loans that are not appropriate or affordable for the borrower. Recently federal and state regula-
tors issued guidance requiring lenders to tighten credit standards on certain high-risk home loans.
However, these standards do not apply to all risky loan products and questionable business practices
common in the subprime market.
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Proposed Solutions  
With billions of dollars in equity already lost, there is an urgent need to curtail foreclosures in the
subprime market and mitigate losses families will incur in the future on unsustainable mortgages. In
brief, CRL recommends the following:
Establish that every borrower has the means to repay his/her loan—without resorting to selling the
property or refinancing under pressure. Unless subprime lenders ensure borrowers can afford their
loans, other efforts to prevent foreclosures will have minimal success. For example, when offering
loans with scheduled interest rate changes, lenders should consider whether the borrower will be
able to afford the mortgage after the initial fixed “teaser” rate expires. Subprime lenders also should
require escrow payments and appropriate verification of the borrower’s income, and they should con-
firm that the loans they offer make economic sense for a given borrower’s circumstances.
Ensure that all parties involved in the loan operate in good faith, and that everyone—not just the
borrower—has a stake in a successful loan outcome. Recently several major banking regulators issued
guidance on nontraditional mortgage product risks. The regulators’ guidance, which recognizes the
risk posed by imprudent underwriting practices, should apply to all subprime ARM loans and non-
traditional products. Similarly, the principles of the guidance should be applied to all subprime 
mortgage lenders. Mortgage brokers should be subject to standards that apply to other financial 
professionals, and they should have an affirmative duty to ensure that the products they recommend
are suitable for their customers. Lenders and appraisers should uphold existing standards to ensure
that appraisals are accurate and independent. And regulators should hold secondary market investors
to basic standards of fair dealing and require them to take reasonable steps to avoid supporting 
abusive subprime loans. 
Help existing subprime borrowers who are in danger of losing their homes. Opportunities for 
reasonable work-out plans can go a long way to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure, and
regulators should focus on banning predatory lenders/servicing practices and enforcement actions
against servicing practices that facilitate subprime loan failures. Community groups, lenders, and
state and local governments have demonstrated the efficacy of a variety of home preservation 
programs, including those that involve targeted outreach to delinquent borrowers, financial 
counseling, and restructuring consumer debt. Another successful model comes from the states 
that have passed strong laws against foreclosure “rescue” scams, banning predators from targeting
struggling borrowers.
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II. BACKGROUND
In the United States, the proportion of mortgages entering 
foreclosure has climbed steadily since 1980, with 847,000 new
foreclosures filed in 2005.1 This year lenders reported 318,000 new
foreclosure filings for the third quarter alone, a 17 percent increase
over the previous quarter and 43 percent higher than the third
quarter of 2005.2 In the past 12 to18 months, there have been fre-
quent stories in the media about risky lending practices and surges
in loan defaults, especially in the subprime mortgage market.3
The subprime market is intended to provide home loans for 
people with impaired or limited credit histories. In addition to
lower incomes and blemished credit, borrowers who get subprime
loans may have unstable income, savings, or employment, and a
high level of debt relative to their income.4 However, there is evidence that many families who
receive subprime mortgages could qualify for prime loans, but are instead  “steered” into accepting
higher-cost subprime loans.5
As shown in Figure 1 below, in a short period of time subprime mortgages have grown from a small
niche market to a major component of home financing. From 1994 to 2005, the subprime home
loan market grew from $35 billion to $665 billion, and is on pace to match 2005’s record level in
2006. From 1998 to 2006, the subprime share of total mortgage originations climbed from 10 per-
cent to 23 percent.6 Over most of this period, the majority of subprime loans have been refinances
rather than purchase mortgages to buy homes.7 Subprime loans are also characterized by higher
interest rates and fees than prime loans, and are more likely to include prepayment penalties and
broker kickbacks.
The growth of the subprime mortgage market has in part been spurred by the deteriorating financial
situation of households in the United States. In large measure, this reflects macroeconomic factors:
over the past two decades, after-tax income for the bottom 60 percent of families climbed only five
to 15 percent while costs for such basics as housing, child care, and health care rose 53 to 75 per-
cent.8 At the same time, rates of personal savings—the financial cushion for most families—have
dropped steadily and have been negative since mid-2005.9 In addition, for many families, their
income stream is much less certain than in the past: a 2004 study reported that the average annual
variation in income for middle-income households ($13,500 at that time) had doubled since the 1970s.10
In a short period of time
subprime mortgages 
have grown from a small
niche market to a major
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Even as many households are financially strained, the 
combination of low interest rates and easy credit (particularly
credit cards) has encouraged consumers to spend more, and to
use debt to cover the gap between their household income and
spending. By mid-2006, the percentage of the average family’s
disposable income that was devoted to covering debt reached
an all-time high.11
In this context, the lending industry has encouraged middle-
and low-income families to conclude that “borrowing against
their homes is a sensible way to plug holes in household 
budgets.”12 American households have used refinances or 
home equity loans to pull money out of their homes at an
unprecedented rate: over two trillion dollars in the past five
years alone.13 And the pace accelerated in early 2006, even 
as interest rates were rising. In the first six months of 2006,
consumers extracted over $500 billion in home equity, more
than the total amount taken out in all of 2005 (which was
itself a record year).14
Taken together, these economic developments have contributed to an increase in the proportion of
American families with lagging and less certain income, fewer savings, higher debt, and less home
equity—in other words, prospective customers for the subprime mortgage market. 
Some have heralded the growth in subprime lending as a positive break-through in extending credit.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan referred to subprime lending as the “democrati-
zation of credit,” a dramatic change that enables borrowers with less-than-perfect credit to receive
access to home loans that would have been denied in the past. To be sure, the community reinvest-
ment movement, civil rights activists, and others have fought for years to bring investment to 
communities that have lacked access to vital capital. 
Yet this increased access has come at great cost to many families, since the highest rate of home
foreclosures occurs among subprime home loans. In many communities, the pressing issue today is
less the availability of home-secured credit than the terms on which credit is offered. For the aver-
age American, building wealth through homeownership is the most accessible path to economic
progress, but progress is not achieved when a family buys or refinances a home only to lose the home
or get caught in a cycle of escalating debt.
For most families, foreclosure is a last resort, often coming in the wake of unemployment, illness,
divorce, or other personal event that causes a drop in income. However, for some homeowners, the
problem is not a change in income, but rather an unmanageable increase in the amount of the mort-
gage payment or the realization that the mortgage was not affordable in the first place.15
A few years ago, this problem likely would have received scant attention from policymakers, since
subprime mortgages represented only a small fraction of the total mortgage market. Today subprime
mortgages comprise almost one quarter of all mortgage originations. The merits of this expanding
market are widely debated, but one point is clear: Subprime mortgage credit—and the accompany-
ing foreclosures—have become a major force in determining how and whether many American 
families will attain sustainable wealth. 
These economic 
developments have 
contributed to an increase
in the proportion of
American families with 
lagging and less certain
income, fewer savings,
higher debt, and less home
equity—in other words,
prospective customers for
the subprime mortgage
market. 
For a brief discussion of previous research on mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, see Appendix 1.
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III. DATA AND METHODS
The findings presented here are based on our analysis of information from a proprietary loan-level
dataset that includes more than six million securitized subprime loans totaling $1.2 trillion 
originated from January 1998 through December 2004. For the full seven-year period, we estimate
that the database covers over 70 percent of the U.S. subprime market, measured by dollar volume
(Table 1). To focus on issues of concern to typical U.S. families, we limited our analysis to loans
originated in the 50 states and the District of Columbia that were secured by a first lien and 
made to borrowers who occupied the home, excluding loans secured by manufactured homes or 
multifamily dwellings.  These selection criteria leave us with an analysis dataset that comprises a
substantial proportion of the overall dataset (see Table 2).
Table 1: Dataset Coverage of Subprime Market
1998 62.5 150 41.2%
1999 67.7 160 42.3%
2000 64.8 138 47.0%
2001 104.4 173 60.1%
2002 166.3 213 78.1%
2003 297.4 332 90.0%
2004 448.3 529 84.7%
Total $1,211.4 $1,695 71.5%
* Source: Inside Mortgage Finance
Origination Year U.S. Subprime
Volume
($ Billions)*
(B)
Observed
Subprime
Volume
($ Billions)
(A)
Observed
Coverage
(A)/(B)
Table 2: Proportion of Subprime Loans Used in Analysis with Designated Characteristics
Origination
Year 
Total No. of
Loans
Originated in 50
States and DC 
(A)
No. of Owner-
Occupied
and 1st Lien
Loans in 50
States and DC
(B)
No. of Single-
Family Owner-
Occupied 
and 1st Lien
Loans in 50
States and DC*
(C)
Observed
Coverage
(C)/(A)
1998 645,194 427,301 400,926 62%
1999 722,978 509,980 479,073 66%
2000 625,961 445,697 427,916 68%
2001 793,524 577,981 554,304 70%
2002 1,128,233 839,125 816,692 72%
2003 1,814,360 1,368,940 1,348,887 74%
2004 2,439,144 1,904,728 1,877,360 77%
Total 8,169,394 6,073,752 5,905,158 72%
*These loans included single-family residences, condos, townhouses, and units in a
planned development.
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Identifying Foreclosures and “Distressed” Prepayments 
In this study, foreclosures are the ultimate outcome of interest. The dataset used here contains both
static information about the loan at origination and dynamic information on payment patterns over
time. Specifically, for each month for a given loan, we know whether the borrower made a payment,
and we have several measures of the loan’s status, including whether the loan was in foreclosure or
delinquent, and whether the borrower was in bankruptcy. For each month, we also know the loan
balance. We coded as a foreclosure any instance in which a loan balance went to zero in a given
month when the prior month’s status was listed as in foreclosure, bankruptcy, or as real estate owned
by the lender (REO). 
When homeowners fear they can no longer make their mortgage payments and know they risk los-
ing their home, they often use two common strategies to avoid foreclosure. One action is to seek a
refinance. Another strategy is to try to salvage some equity by selling the home.16 Because the result
of either of these exit strategies, if successful, is a zero dollar balance on the loan in default, they are
observed in our data as prepayments. We identify instances in which a borrower prepays a mortgage
that was 30 or more days delinquent as a “distressed prepayment” following research from Danis and
Pennington-Cross.17
To explore the relationship among foreclosures, distressed prepayments, and differing house price
appreciation rates, we examined our dataset of subprime home loans by year of origination and by
metropolitan statistical area (MSA). After observing foreclosure rates and distressed prepayment
rates, we estimated elementary regression models to explore the relationship among foreclosures, 
distressed prepayments, and housing price appreciation. We then used these results to project 
foreclosure experiences going forward. For more information on methods used, see Appendix 2. 
A Tale of Two Foreclosure Rates
Analysts and the media often cite a mortgage foreclosure rate calculated by the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA), which is based on data from about 150 mortgage servicers. The MBA rate com-
monly cited reflects the percentage of outstanding loans that are in foreclosure at a specific point in
time (e.g., at the end of the second quarter 2006). This statistic is useful for comparing results across
geographic markets.
An alternative measure is the total proportion of loans originated during a given time period 
that end in foreclosure. Such rates are used by mortgage lenders, investors, insurers, and rating 
agencies to predict the risk and profitability of a group of loans, and also may be used to compare 
the performance among different types of loans or loans originated in different years. 
Example of Differences in Published Foreclosure Rates
2.34%   MBA-reported foreclosure rate for FHA loans at end of 4Q05
6.29%   Cumulative foreclosure rate at end of 2005 for FHA loans made in 2000
Sources: MBA National Delinquency Survey, 4Q 2005 and FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Analysis
FY 2005
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IV. FINDINGS
A. For subprime mortgages originated from 1998 through 2006, we project that 2.2 million
U.S. households will lose their homes to foreclosure, costing these households as much as $164
billion. One out of every five (19.4 percent) subprime loans made today will fail.
For the subprime market as a whole, the 19.4 percent foreclosure rate exceeds the worst ever seen
in the modern mortgage market—a 14.9 percent foreclosure rate in the “Oil Patch” states of
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma during the 1980s.18 Just as that episode reflected a
downturn in a large regional housing market, we find that the current increase in subprime mort-
gage foreclosure risk is driven by the cooling of the housing sector in areas where house prices had
previously climbed rapidly, such as California, Nevada, New York, New Jersey, and the Washington,
D.C. area. 
Our analysis shows that the increase in foreclosures is partially the result of subprime market weak-
nesses that have been harder to observe during a period of increasing home values: a “trade off”
between foreclosure rates and the rates at which borrowers prepay their mortgages while delinquent.
We find that a large proportion of borrowers have been exiting their mortgages under duress, even
during recent times of remarkable housing price appreciation. For these borrowers, strong house
price growth increased the amount of equity in their homes and enabled them to use this equity to
refinance their mortgages despite being behind on the monthly payments. Today, without that
strong appreciation, it appears that many more borrowers are unable to refinance while delinquent
and find themselves in foreclosure instead.
The projected foreclosure rate and accompanying losses are based on the following findings from
our research:
1. Even under recent favorable economic conditions, as many as one in eight subprime loans
originated between 1998 and 2004 ended in foreclosure within five years.
As shown in Table 3, the proportion of foreclosed subprime loans is substantial. For example, one in
every eight subprime home loans (12.9 percent) originated in 2000 was foreclosed by May 2005.
While Table 3 reports lower to-date cumulative foreclosures for more recent years as of this date,
this is largely because these loans had not yet experienced their peak foreclosure activity as of 
May 2005.
Table 3: Subprime Home Loan Terminations By Year of Origination (as of May 2005)
Year of Origination Number of Loans Percent Prepaid (A) Percent Foreclosed (B) Percent of Loans 
Still Outstanding
1- (A) -(B)
1998 400,926 79.3 9.7 11.0
1999 479,073 71.9 12.0 16.1
2000 427,916 69.4 12.9 17.7
2001 554,304 70.2 8.2 21.6
2002 816,692 65.2 4.1 30.7
2003 1,348,887 41.7 1.2 57.1
2004 1,877,360 13.7 0.2 86.1
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In fact, Figure 2 shows that more recent loans are performing quite similarly to earlier annual loan
cohorts, particularly with respect to loans originated in 2000. Each line in Figure 2 represents the
proportion of loans originated in a given year that have foreclosed at a given age. The slight differ-
ences between foreclosure patterns in the 2000 cohort and later cohorts is almost entirely explained
by fast prepayments among those later loans (see Appendix 2 for more information).
Figure 2: Subprime Cumulative Foreclosure Rate by Year of Origination
2. One in 10 subprime mortgages in recent years have prepaid while delinquent. When these
distressed prepayments are added to the foreclosure rates, the composite subprime “failure rate”
approaches 25 percent within five years of origination.
The data from recent years indicate that almost half of all subprime loans will be delinquent at least
once within five years (see Table 4). More than one fifth will actually experience a foreclosure start.
For example, 21.2 percent of 1999 loans and 22.9 percent of loans made in 2000 received a foreclo-
sure notice at some point before June 2005. This is in and of itself a troubling trend, since these
foreclosure starts have an adverse effect on a borrower’s creditworthiness as evaluated by credit scor-
ing bureaus and lenders. 
Yet Table 4 also shows that, at least in recent years, only a portion of these delinquent and defaulted
loans finished the foreclosure process. Many of the rest of these delinquent and defaulted loans were
prepaid, often while still delinquent. For example, for loans made in 2000, Table 4 shows that half
(49.6 percent) were delinquent at some point; one in five (22.9 percent) started foreclosure at least
once; one in eight (12.9 percent) finished foreclosure; and one in ten (11.1 percent) prepaid while
delinquent (termed a distressed prepayment). 
Undoubtedly the majority of distressed prepayments represent homeowners who could not make
their monthly payments and turned either to a refinance or to the sale of their home to avoid fore-
closure. In either case, they were likely to experience a loss in the process. For example, borrowers
who refinance a delinquent loan typically will pay a higher interest rate on their new loan because
of the higher risk. Also, if they prepay their loan during the first 24-36 months of its life, they 
usually will incur a prepayment penalty. Alternatively, borrowers who sell a home under pressure 
are likely to recover less than the full fair market value.
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If the proportion of these distressed prepayments were small, this concern might be easily dismissed
but, as shown in Table 4, adding distressed prepayments to observed foreclosures shows that a size-
able proportion of the market ended mortgages under duress—roughly one quarter of all subprime loans. 
Table 4: Indications of Homeowner Distress as of May 2005
1998 41.8 16.0 9.7 10.8 20.5
1999 47.6 21.2 12.0 11.0 23.0
2000 49.6 22.9 12.9 11.1 24.0
2001 42.0 17.0 8.2 9.4 17.6
2002 36.0 10.9 4.1 8.3 12.4
2003 25.9 5.6 1.2 4.4 5.6
2004 16.6 2.8 0.2 1.3 1.5
Origination
Year
Percent Ever
Delinquent
Percent
Foreclosed (A)
Percent  
Prepaid
In Distress (B)
Percent
Foreclosed or
Prepaid in
Distress
(A) + (B)
3. Regression results show that distressed prepayments and foreclosure rates move in 
opposite directions in response to changes in housing appreciation. This suggests that distressed
prepayments are “substitutes” for foreclosures in strong housing markets. In other words, strong
housing appreciation may protect a market from high foreclosures, but not from failed loans. 
Research on mortgage defaults has long noted that foreclosures are more likely in situations where
borrowers hold less equity,19 as is the case when housing prices dip or even when the growth in
prices slows. While house price increases in recent years have generally been strong in the United
States, they have not been strong everywhere. Accordingly, we took advantage of the variation in
housing price appreciation rates found across the nation’s metropolitan statistical areas to estimate
the relationship between appreciation rates and subprime foreclosure rates. We also examined how
different appreciation rates influenced the proportion of loans prepaying while delinquent, as well as
the effect of varying appreciation rates on the composite failure rate (foreclosures plus distressed pre-
payments.)  See Appendix 2 for a description of our methods. 
The results in Table 5 confirm that foreclosures are more likely in housing markets experiencing less
housing price appreciation. Also as expected, the results show that more borrowers refinance while
delinquent in stronger housing markets. For example, for loans originated in 2001, each percentage
point increase in annual housing price appreciation was associated with a 7.23 percent decrease in
the odds of foreclosure and a 2.84 percent increase in the odds of distressed prepayment. Moreover,
Percent Ever in
Foreclosure
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the consistency of this pattern across multiple annual origination cohorts is additional evidence that
these relationships are substantial and robust. These findings support the contention that distressed
prepayments and foreclosures are substitute outcomes that respond in opposite directions to a given
change in housing prices. 
Table 5: Increased Percentage Risk of Various Loan Outcomes Associated with One Percentage 
Point Increase in Annual Housing Price Appreciation, By Year of Loan Origination
Dependent Variables Origination Year
1999 2000 2001 2002
Foreclosed -8.32*** -8.26*** -7.23*** -5.95***
Distressed prepaid 1.04* 2.63*** 2.84*** 2.53***
Distressed prepaid or foreclosed -4.12*** -3.46*** -2.08*** -0.34
Notes: Unit of observation is MSA, n=950 for all models. Confidence levels: * = 95%, ** = 99%, *** = 99.9%.
Increased risk measured as the percentage change in the odds of a given outcome occurring in a given MSA.
The results from Table 5 are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4 below. As can be observed, 
foreclosure is downward sloping as housing price appreciation rates rise (Figure 3), while distressed
prepayments are upward sloping in the face of stronger appreciation (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Impact of Housing Price Appreciation on Risk of Foreclosure 
0 5
5
10
10
15
15
20
20
25 30
Housing Price Appreciation Per Year
Pe
rc
en
t 
Fo
re
cl
os
ed
(%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Housing Price Appreciation Per Year
10
12
14
16
Pe
rc
en
t 
D
is
tr
es
se
d 
Pr
ep
ay
m
en
t
(%)
Figure 4: Impact of Housing Price Appreciation on Proportion of Distressed Prepayments
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4. Ultimately, we project that 15.4 percent of subprime loans originated between 1998 and 
the third quarter of 2006 will foreclose, and that the probability of foreclosure will double 
from a low of one in ten (9.8 percent) for loans originated in 2002 to a high of one in five 
(19.4 percent) for loans originated in 2005 and 2006.  We also estimate that, in the end, 
these foreclosed loans will cost homeowners as much as $164 billion.
Applying the relationships we found between differing housing price appreciation rates and loan
outcomes, we are able to provide projections for total foreclosures and associated losses for each
annual cohort of subprime home loans. Essentially, this estimate is generated by using the observed
foreclosure and loss rates associated with known housing price appreciation rates, and extrapolating
to expected performance based on the difference between the rates of appreciation observed and
those forecasted by Moody’s Economy.com.20 For a complete description of methods, please see
Appendix 2.
Table 6 provides the results of this analysis, separately reporting observed outcomes and projected
outcomes. To assist readers, the results in Table 6 are scaled to full market size and the observed out-
comes are from date of origination through May 2005 and projections are for the life of the loan.21
So, for example, Table 6 reports that 43,260 loans made in 2002 had been foreclosed by May 2005
and projects that an additional 58,992 loans originated in that year will ultimately be foreclosed. In
total, we project that 2.2 million (15.4 percent) of 14 million subprime home loans made from 1998
through 2006 will end in foreclosure. The rates of foreclosure, however, are not uniform across all
years. For example, we note the increase in projected foreclosures for more recent mortgages that
were originated when house prices were at their peak in late 2004 through early 2006 (see Figure 5).
Specifically, total projected foreclosures climb from 9.8 percent for loans originated in 2002 to 19.4
percent for loans made in 2005 and 2006.
We note that these findings are similar to those in at least two other recent analyses of subprime
mortgages. In the first, Pennington-Cross and Ho analyze the propensity of subprime adjustable rate
mortgages and fixed rate mortgages to foreclose.22 After analyzing a large set of subprime loans origi-
nated from 1998 to 2005, and following those loans to the end of 2005, they report that “at the end
of five years almost exactly 18 percent of the loans have defaulted and almost 70 percent have pre-
paid.”23 Similarly, using a large database of securitized subprime loans originated by retail lenders in
1999, researchers at the University of North Carolina reported that 20.7 percent of subprime loans
they examined from that year had experienced a foreclosure start at least once within five years of
origination.24
In any case, these high rates of foreclosures have serious implications for households with subprime
mortgages. When a foreclosure occurs, homeowners forfeit their house as well as the wealth they
have invested (their down payment and principal payments) and other equity they gained as their
home appreciated. Table 6 shows that homeowners have lost as much as $45.7 billion, primarily in
home equity, as a consequence of subprime foreclosures on loans originated from 1998 to 2004 as of
May 2005. Going forward, Table 6 shows that homeowners who received mortgages from 1998 to
2006 are projected to lose as much as $164 billion.
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Further, just as foreclosure rates are not constant across all years, they also are not uniform across
states. In large part, this pattern flows from the substantial variation in housing price appreciation
across local markets. Figures 6 and 7 below graphically display the projected total foreclosure rates
for the various states for loans originated in 1998-2001 and 2006 respectively, and the specific rates
are listed in Appendix 4. 
US Subprime Loansa Loans Foreclosed Losses ($ billions)
Volume ($ billions) No. Loans Observed Projected Total Observed Projected
1998 114 962,273 93,209 1,541 9.8% 6.9 0.0
1999 124 1,132,280 135,891 8,676 12.8% 8.1 0.2
2000 111 911,369 117,958 15,168 14.6% 8.6 0.4
2001 145 918,557 75,152 30,312 11.5% 10.8 1.2
2002 181 1,046,072 43,260 58,992 9.8% 7.6 3.5
2003 281 1,505,854 18,635 162,829 12.1% 3.2 11.5
2004 452 2,219,547 3,808 344,687 15.7% 0.5 26.6
2005b 512 3,259,908 0 632,302 19.4% 0 42.3
2006b, c 391 2,490,275 0 483,022 19.4% 0 32.3
Total 2,311 14,446,135 487,913 1,737,529 15.4% 45.7 118.0
Total 2,225,442 15.4% $164
Table 6: Projected Subprime Foreclosures and Losses, by Annual Origination Cohort
Notes: 
a) Includes only loans to owner-occupants in the 50 states and the District of Columbia secured by a first-lien
on a single-family home, condominium, townhouse, or a unit in a planned development.
b) 2005 and 2006 estimates of U.S. subprime lending from Inside Mortgage Finance and SMR Research
Corporation modified to account for the criteria in note a.
c) 2006 only includes loans from 1Q2006 to 3Q2006.
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As Figure 6 shows, high subprime foreclosure rates in the past 
primarily were a problem for states in the central U.S., such 
as Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Now Figure 7 shows a 
“darkening”  foreclosure picture across the U.S., where almost
every state will experience high foreclosure rates.25 Further, 
foreclosure rate increases will be felt most acutely in states with
previously strong appreciation (such as California, New York,
Maryland and Virginia.) While methods and limitations are dis-
cussed more completely in Appendix 2, it is worth noting here that
these findings do not take into account the effect that any recent
policy changes may have on foreclosure rates.
Figure 7 shows a 
darkening  foreclosure 
picture across the U.S.,
where almost every state
will experience high 
foreclosure rates. 
5% – 10%
11% – 15%
16% – 20%
21% – 24%
Foreclosure rates for Alaska and Hawaii are 11% and 5% respectively
Figure 6: Projected
State Foreclosure
Rates for Subprime
Loans Originated
1998-2001
Figure 7: Projected
State Foreclosure
Rates for Subprime
Loans Originated 
in 2006
Specific
rates for
each state
are listed in
Appendix 4.
Specific
rates for
each state
are listed in
Appendix 4.
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Subprime-to-Subprime Refinance Rate
Foreclosure 
Rate 50% 60% 70%
10% 17% 20% 23%
15% 25% 29% 32%
20% 32% 36% 41%
25% 39% 44% 49%
5.  While one in five households with subprime loans originated in 2005 and 2006 is 
projected to foreclose, other families who took out these loans and then refinanced into 
subsequent subprime loans also will experience foreclosure. Using the best information 
available, we estimate that one-third of families who received a subprime loan in 2005 and 
2006 will ultimately lose their homes.
Our estimated 19.4 percent foreclosure rate for subprime loans originated in 2005 and 2006 is in and
of itself disconcerting, but it actually represents only the likelihood that one specific subprime loan
will end in foreclosure, not the cumulative foreclosure rate for an individual borrower or household
who took out that initial loan. While more research is needed, one study based on a survey of thou-
sands of borrowers found that 60 percent of subprime borrowers do not “move up” into a prime loan
when refinancing, but instead get another subprime loan.26 As Table 7 below illustrates, a borrower
who repeatedly refinances one subprime loan with another faces steadily increasing chances of
foreclosure, reaching 36 percent by the fourth loan. 
Table 7 is based on the assumption that 19 percent of subprime loans foreclose, and 60 percent of
those borrowers who refinance transition to another a subprime loan, and that these probabilities
are constant for all loans. To extend this experiment, Table 8 shows the increase in the cumulative
foreclosure rates after three refinances associated with variations on these assumptions. For example,
if the actual foreclosure probability for a subprime loan is altered to 25 percent and the proportion
of subprime borrowers who refinance and receive a subsequent subprime loan is altered to 
70 percent, then the cumulative probability of foreclosure grows to 49 percent. 
Table 7: Projected Multiple Loan Subprime Foreclosure Rates
Proportion of
Borrowers
from Original
Loan Cohort
Proportion of
Original
Cohort
Refinanced to
Prime
Proportion of
Original
Cohort
Foreclosed 
Cumulative
Cohort
Foreclosure
Rate 
Original Loan Cohort 100% 32% 20% 20%
Refinance 1 48% 15% 10% 30%
Refinance 2 23% 7% 5% 34%
Refinance 3 11% 4% 2% 36%
Table 8: Sensitivity of Cumulative Foreclosure Rate After Three
Refinances to Subprime Refinance Rate and Foreclosure Rate
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B. Many local markets that have experienced extraordinary housing price appreciation in recent
years are likely to experience marked increases in subprime foreclosure rates.
As history has shown, local housing markets with high levels of
appreciation and low foreclosure rates are in an unsustainable situ-
ation. Typically, a rapid run-up of home prices in overheated mar-
kets makes housing less affordable and leads to a slowdown. While
in many cases this is a gradual process, there are times when eco-
nomic conditions trigger a severe drop in house prices. It happened
in the 1970s in the “rust belt” states of the Midwest, as the once
dominant industrial region experienced widespread factory closings
and unemployment. As mentioned previously, it happened in the
mid-1980s in the Oil Patch states. And it happened in the early
1990s in both the Northeast and California.27
Currently, all signs are pointing to a drop in house prices in many U.S. markets, including the
southwest coast of Florida, many metropolitan areas of California, Arizona, Nevada, and the greater
Washington, D.C. area. As the chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com puts it: “The housing mar-
ket downturn is in full swing.”28
For each MSA, we project foreclosure rates based on observed and forecasted housing price appreci-
ation rates. Again, forecasted housing price appreciation rates were obtained from a recent study by
Moody’s Economy.com.29 While complete MSA results are available in Appendix 5, Table 9 shows
the top fifteen local markets with the highest projected foreclosure rates for subprime loans originat-
ed in 2006. Similarly, Table 10 shows the top fifteen markets with the largest increase in projected
subprime foreclosure rates for loans originated in 2006, compared to foreclosure rates expected for
subprime loans made from 1998 through 2001. The top fourteen markets on this list are in
California.
All signs are pointing to
a drop in house prices in
many U.S. markets.
“I have never seen a soft landing in 53 years.”
Angelo Mozilo, CEO
Countrywide Financial
Source: Patrick Crowley, “Mortgage Outlook Gloomy,”
MortgageDaily.com (August 31, 2006)
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1 Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 3.0 22.8 668%
2 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA 2.8 19.6 596%
3 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 3.2 21.4 567%
4 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 3.4 21.1 527%
5 Napa, CA 2.6 16.4 527%
6 San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 3.0 16.7 462%
7 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 3.2 17.6 453%
8 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA 2.6 13.6 416%
9 Salinas, CA 4.0 20.4 413%
10 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 4.7 23.8 405%
11 Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 4.6 21.3 359%
12 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 3.2 14.5 356%
13 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 4.3 19.3 352%
14 Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 4.8 21.0 339%
15 Barnstable Town, MA 4.8 19.9 313%
See Appendix 5 for results for all MSAs.
Table 9: Top 15 MSA Projected Foreclosure Rates for Subprime Loans Originated in 2006
Rank MSA Foreclosure Rate (%)
1 Merced, CA 25.0
2 Bakersfield, CA 24.2
3 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 23.8
4 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 23.7
T5 Fresno, CA 23.5
T5 Ocean City, NJ 23.5
7 Stockton, CA 23.4
8 Reno-Sparks, NV 23.2
T9 Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 22.8
T9 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 22.8
11 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 22.6
12 Carson City, NV 22.5
T13 Atlantic City, NJ 22.2
T13 Visalia-Porterville, CA 22.2
T15 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 22.0
T15 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 22.0
T15 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 22.0
Table 10: Top 15 Largest Increases in Subprime Foreclosure Rates by MSA 
(Comparing projected foreclosure rates on loans made from 1998–2001
to projected foreclosure rates on loans made in 2006)
Projected
Foreclosure Rate
for 1998-2001
cohort of sub-
prime loans
Projected
Foreclosure Rate
for 2006 cohort of
subprime loans
Projected %
Change
Rank
based
on %
change
See Appendix 5 for results for all MSAs.
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ARM vs. Fixed-Rate Loan 123.3*** 86.0*** 72.0*** 61.8*** 77.9*** 117.1*** 
Balloon vs. Fixed-Rate Amortizing Loan 75.7*** 51.8*** 36.0*** 21.7*** 14.1* 85.9*** 
Loan with Prepayment Penalty 
vs. Loan with No Prepayment Penalty 70.4*** 65.0*** 52.4*** 35.8*** 25.8*** 18.7*** 
Loan with No or Low Documentation 
vs. Full-Doc Loan 5.6** 19.0*** 29.0*** 25.8*** 44.7*** 63.7***
Purchase Money Loan 
vs. Refinance Loan 19.3** * 20.7*** 28.5*** 37.9*** 61.0*** 102.0 ***
C. Subprime loans are riskier in and of themselves, not just
because the borrowers may have weaker credit. Borrowers who
are already financially vulnerable are receiving loans associated
with a higher risk of default.
We explored whether certain features of subprime loans are 
associated with an increased risk of entering foreclosure. Our 
analysis is consistent with other studies in finding that subprime
loans with certain characteristics have a higher likelihood of
default than subprime loans without those features, even when
controlling for differences in credit scores.30 These higher-risk 
features include adjustable interest rates (typically with large,
scheduled payment increases), loans with prepayment penalties 
or balloon payments, and “low-doc” and “no-doc” loans, in which
lenders approve borrowers for loans based on little or no 
verification of the borrower’s income and assets.31
Table 11 shows the results of this analysis. For example, we observe
a higher risk of foreclosure for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs)
compared with fixed-rate mortgages. This foreclosure risk was 62 percent to 123 percent higher,
depending upon the year the loan was originated. Our dataset includes a significant number of
hybrid or exploding ARMs, which have been the predominant product in the subprime market in
recent years. As described in the discussion section of this report, hybrid ARMS offer low teaser
rates and the high probability of severe “payment shock” when the fixed-payment period expires
after two years. 
We also found a 14 percent to 86 percent higher risk of foreclosure for loans with balloon payments,
and a 19 percent to 70 percent higher risk for loans that carried prepayment penalties. In addition,
loans that were originated with low or no documentation of the borrower’s income had five percent
to 64 percent more foreclosure risk than loans with full documentation, and these loans represent
just under half of the market today.32
Our analysis is consistent
with other studies in 
finding that subprime
loans with certain 
characteristics have a
higher likelihood of
default than subprime
loans without those 
features, even when 
controlling for differences
in credit scores. 
Table 11: Percentage Increase in Foreclosure Risk for Specific Loan Features by Annual Loan Cohort 
(Positive numbers indicate higher risk, after controlling for borrower credit scores)
Confidence levels: * = 95%, ** = 99%, *** = 99.9%. Detailed results available upon request.
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Interestingly, subprime purchase loans also showed a 19 percent to 102 percent higher risk of 
foreclosure compared to subprime refinance loans. It is likely that high housing prices in recent
years meant that many families strained their budgets to qualify for purchase loans. That strain may
have been exacerbated by higher financing costs on subprime loans. 
Further, Figure 8 illustrates that in several cases the proportion of subprime loans with higher risk
features has been large, or has increased in recent years. This should be cause for significant con-
cern, particularly since these trends have continued in 2006 (see discussion in the next section). 
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Source: Proprietary dataset (See Appendix 3 for summary statistics.)
V. DISCUSSION: THE COSTS AND CAUSES OF UNSUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP
A. The Costs: Individuals and Communities
Many Americans work hard and make great sacrifices to become homeowners, and for good reasons.
For most families, homeownership is the most accessible path to economic security, and is associated
with a host of non-economic benefits, including safer neighborhoods, better health and higher 
educational achievement.33 However, in today’s refinance-dominated subprime market, many 
borrowers risk their economic well-being for loans with lower monthly payments in the short term
but a higher risk of financial ruin in the longer term. With a one-in-five failure rate on subprime
loans—even higher for borrowers who get multiple subprime mortgages—holding a subprime loan
has become something of a high-stakes wager. 
Some may argue that high foreclosure rates are an acceptable price to pay for expanding access to
credit, but this benefit must be balanced against a high proportion of families who lose their homes,
the enormous costs to these families and their communities, and the difficulty of recovering.  In
addition to lost equity, families who lose their homes suffer other adverse effects, including a dam-
aged credit history. These setbacks mean that they will be forced to pay more for any type of credit in
the future. Research also shows that, after families give up homeownership for any reason, it can take
a decade or more to buy another home.34  
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Even if they are able to avoid foreclosure, homeowners pay a
heavy cost for being in default on their mortgage, including
late fees, collection fees, and legal fees assessed by the lender
or servicer. (In fact, fee-padding and other tactics used by
some subprime servicers have been alleged to increase the risk
of foreclosures, a potential contributory factor that is beyond
the scope of this study.35)  Even consumers who successfully
sell their home with enough proceeds to pay off their mort-
gage will lose home equity in sales transaction costs, and also
may incur a prepayment penalty for thousands of dollars.
These are just some of the direct, immediate costs of default.
There are additional financial, social, and psychological costs
of relocating and beginning again, which, though harder to
quantify, are just as real and should not be ignored. 
1. Bearing the Brunt: Communities of Color 
and Low-Wealth Families
The costs of subprime foreclosures fall heavily on African-American and Latino homeowners, since
subprime mortgages are disproportionately made in communities of color. The most recent lending
data submitted under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) show that over half of loans to
African-American borrowers were higher-cost loans, which, by definition, are a proxy for subprime
loans. For Latino homeowners, the portion of higher-cost loans is also very high, at four in ten. As
shown in Table 12, this implies that subprime foreclosures will affect eight percent of recent Latino
borrowers and 10 percent of recent African-American borrowers. By comparison, subprime foreclo-
sures will likely occur among only about four percent of recent white borrowers.
However, while the negative impact of foreclosures falls disproportionately on communities of color,
the problem is not confined to any one group. In absolute terms, white homeowners received three
times as many higher-cost mortgages, and therefore will experience a significant number of foreclo-
sures as well.36
Table 12: Higher Cost Loans and Subprime Foreclosure Impact by Race/Ethnicity*
2005 Data Submitted by Lenders Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
% of Total Loans to
Racial/Ethnic Groups
(A)
2005 Projected
Foreclosure Rate
(B)
% Borrowers Affected
by Foreclosure
(A) * (B)
African American 52% 19.4% 10%
Latino 40% 19.4% 8%
White, Non-Latino 19% 19.4% 4%
Note: Column A data from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2006).
Subprime foreclosures 
will affect eight percent 
of recent Latino borrowers
and 10 percent of recent
African-American borrowers.
By comparison, subprime
foreclosures will likely occur
among only about four 
percent of recent white 
borrowers.
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2. The Pain Spreads: Neighborhoods and Cities
When a home goes into foreclosure, the negative effects extend beyond
individual families to surrounding neighbors and the wider community.
For example, Immergluck and Smith found that in Chicago a foreclo-
sure started on a home lowered the price of other nearby single-family
homes, on average, by 0.9 percent.37 They also reported that the down-
ward pressure on housing prices extended to houses that sold within two
years of the foreclosure.  
Further, Immergluck and Smith found this negative impact was cumulative; that is, each additional
foreclosure start on the block lowered values an additional 0.9 percent. The impact was even higher
in lower-income neighborhoods, where each foreclosure dropped home values by an average of 1.44
percent. Overall, the researchers estimated that the cost to the City of Chicago for these foreclo-
sures, as measured by reduced property value and a lower tax base, was $598 million to $1.4 billion.38
An additional expense to communities is the cost to govern or manage parts of the foreclosure
process, including house inspections, additional policing of vacant properties, sheriff sales, etc.
Another study of Chicago-area foreclosures, this one by the Homeownership Preservation Fund,
found that the typical cost incurred by the City for a vacant foreclosed property sold at auction was
between $5,400 and $7,000.39
B. The Causes: What Makes the Failure Rate So High?
Several factors contribute to the high rate of foreclosures in the subprime market. First, the drive for
growth in the subprime market has led to a proliferation of risky loan products and looser standards
for qualifying borrowers, as illustrated in Figure 8. A 2005 survey of credit underwriting practices by
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found a “clear trend toward easing of underwriting
standards as banks stretch for volume and yield.”40
Second, there is the structure of the industry itself. The high proportion of broker-originated loans
in the subprime market (about two-thirds of the total) means that the primary loan sellers are those
who have strong incentives to close as many loans as possible with little direct incentive to consider
these loans’ viability. Lenders, in turn, can minimize the cost of unexpected foreclosures because
they typically cede much of this risk to the secondary loan market. 
Finally, there are insufficient legal and regulatory consequences for making home loans that are pre-
dictably unsustainable. Federal banking regulators recently issued guidance on nontraditional mort-
gages that requires depository institutions (such as banks) and their affiliates to tighten credit stan-
dards for certain nontraditional loans, such as interest-only and payment-option ARMs.41 Similarly,
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors has issued guidance that largely is equivalent to the feder-
al guidance, but is intended to apply to state-chartered non-depository institutions and state
licensed-mortgage brokers. Observers expect that forty-nine states and the District of Columbia will
issue the model guidance in some form.42 However, it is not clear that these standards apply to all
types of risky loan products and practices common in the subprime market. 
A foreclosure started
on a home lowered
the price of other
nearby single-family
homes by 0.9 percent. 
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These risk factors stand apart from risks posed by debt-strapped borrowers themselves—a condition
that virtually defines the subprime market—and lower housing appreciation and rising interest rates,
which are outside of borrowers’ or lenders’ control. Here we briefly discuss business practices and
policies that have evolved in the subprime market during recent years that contribute to a high rate
of foreclosures:
1. Risky Loans: Homeowners in Shock
Lenders and mortgage insurers have long known
that some home loans carry an inherently greater
risk of foreclosure than others. Our research iden-
tifies several factors associated with a higher rate
of foreclosure in the subprime market, including
mortgages with an adjustable interest rate rather
than fixed; balloon payments; prepayment penal-
ties; and loans approved without documents veri-
fying income and/or employment. In addition reg-
ulators have expressed concern about combining
multiple risk elements in one loan, stating  “risk-
layering features in loans to subprime borrowers
may significantly increase risks for both the . . .
[lender] and the borrower.”43
FHA Loans: Similar Borrowers, Better Record
Like subprime loans, FHA loans are intended to serve riskier borrowers. However, FHA and subprime
loans have quite different foreclosure rates.  For example, subprime loans originated in 2000 in our sample
had a 12.9% foreclosure rate within five years.  In contrast, the 2005 actuarial review of the FHA Mutual
Mortgage Insurance Fund (the latest available at this time) shows that FHA loans originated in 2000 had
a 6.29% foreclosure rate by year-end 2005.* (This difference is generally consistent for all the years in our
sample.) 
In some ways, this finding is counter-intuitive, since FHA has steadily lost market share to the subprime
sector, due to lower profitability for lenders and fewer loan programs for consumers.  As a result, we might
expect that FHA has been “adversely selected,” with lenders using FHA for only the most credit-impaired
borrowers and offering subprime loans to better qualified consumers (including the “Alt-A” borrowers
with the best credit histories). 
However, structural differences between FHA and subprime programs during the study period may help
explain why a larger proportion of FHA borrowers avoid foreclosure. First, FHA loans are predominantly
fixed-rate, amortizing loans and establish escrow accounts for taxes and insurance. Second, FHA provides
more consumer protections and lower costs during the origination process. Third, FHA servicing practices
emphasize curing delinquencies with foreclosure as the last resort.
Regardless of the reason, FHA’s experience shows that it is possible to serve borrowers with lower credit
scores without putting them at undue risk of losing their homes.
* Source: FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Analysis FY 2005
A look at 24 foreclosures filed in
January 2006 in Hardin County,
Ohio:
All but two were high-interest 
subprime loans.
Most included prepayment penalties.
All but five had adjustable interest rate
loans.
The average life span of loans was about 13
months from origination to foreclosure.
From “The Real Price of High-Risk
Mortgages” by Geoff Dutton and Doug
Haddix, The Columbus Dispatch
(Feb 19, 2006).
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Because the subprime market is designed to serve borrowers who
have credit problems, one might expect the industry to offer sub-
prime loan products that do not magnify the risk of loan failure. In
fact, the opposite is true, because subprime lenders seek to structure
loans with very low monthly payments. As a result, many subprime
loans carry the risk of payment shock, meaning that the homeown-
er’s monthly payment start low, but can quickly skyrocket to an
unaffordable level. 
Unfortunately, payment shock is not unusual, but represents a 
typical risk that comes with the overwhelming majority of subprime
home loans. Today the dominant type of subprime loan is an
adjustable-rate mortgage called a “2/28” that effectively operates as a
two-year balloon.44 (See “Loose Underwriting” discussion below.)
This ARM comes with an initial fixed “teaser” rate for two years,
followed by rate adjustments in six-month increments for the
remainder of the term of the loan.45 Hybrid ARMs and hybrid 
interest-only ARMs have become “the main staples of the subprime
sector.”46 Through the second quarter of 2006, hybrid ARMs made
up 81 percent of the subprime sector’s securitized loans, up from 
64 percent in 2002.47
As a result, payment shock for subprime borrowers has become a growing concern. According to
Barron’s, over the next two years, reset of two-year initial interest rates on hybrid ARMs will lead to
increased monthly payments on an estimated $600 billion of subprime mortgages.48 Fitch Ratings
has calculated that by the end of 2006, payments will have increased on 41 percent of the outstand-
ing subprime loans—29 percent of subprime loans are scheduled for an initial rate reset and another
12 percent of subprime loans will face a periodic readjustment.49
Another problem for borrowers who receive higher-risk ARMs to purchase homes is that they make
monthly payments while making little or no progress in becoming a true homeowner. Subprime
loans are increasingly being made available with options that limit repayment of the loan’s principal
and equity accumulation (for example, interest-only, 40/50 year terms, “Option ARMs” that allow
for payment of less than full amount of interest due).50 These loans often come with slow or negative
amortization that not only can produce payment shock, but also dramatically increases the risk that
the borrower will not have enough equity to support a refinance. 
2. Loose Underwriting: Affordability Matters
Lenders who market exploding ARMs often do not consider whether the homeowner will be able to
pay when the loan’s interest rate resets, setting the borrower up for failure. Subprime lenders’ public
disclosures indicate that some are qualifying borrowers at or near the initial start rate, even when it
is clear from the terms of the loan that the interest rate can rise significantly, giving the borrower a
higher monthly payment. For example, a recent prospectus shows a large subprime lender, Option
One, underwriting to the lesser of the fully-indexed rate or one percentage point over the start
rate.51 For a loan with a typical teaser-rate 2/28 structure, the latter would always apply. This prac-
tice indicates that lenders routinely qualify borrowers for loans based on a low interest rate when
the cost of the loan is bound to rise significantly—even if interest rates remain constant. In fact, it
is not uncommon for 2/28 mortgages to be originated with an interest rate four or even five percent-
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age points under the fully-indexed rate. For a loan with
an eight percent start rate, a four percent increase is
tantamount to a 40 percent increase in the payment
amount. 
A lender’s failure to consider payment shock when
underwriting is compounded by two other common
business practices: failure to escrow property taxes and
hazard insurance, and reduced or no documentation of
income.52 Most subprime lenders make loans based on
low monthly payments that do not escrow for taxes or
insurance.53 This deceptive practice gives the borrower
the impression that the payment is affordable when, in
fact, there are significant additional costs. A recent
study by the Home Ownership Preservation Initiative
in Chicago found that among low income borrowers
facing difficulty in managing their mortgage payments,
for as many as one in seven, tax and insurance pay-
ments are a contributing factor.54 When homeowners
are faced with large tax and insurance bills they cannot
pay, the original lender or a subprime competitor can
benefit by enticing the borrowers to refinance the loan
and pay additional fees for their new loan. In contrast, it is common practice in the prime market 
to escrow taxes and insurance and to consider those costs when looking at debt-to-income and the
borrower’s ability to repay.55
Inadequate documentation also compromises a lender’s ability to assess the true affordability of a
loan. Fitch recently noted that “loans underwritten using less than full documentation standards
comprise more than 50 percent of the subprime sector . . . ”[emphasis added].56 Similarly, others
have observed that over one-third of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in 2005 consisted of
loans with alternative documentation or no documentation loans.57 Low-doc and no-doc loans origi-
nally were intended for use with the limited category of borrowers who are self-employed or whose
incomes are otherwise legitimately not reported on a W-2 tax form, but lenders have increasingly
used these loans to obscure violations of sound underwriting practices. For example, a review of a
sample of these “stated-income” loans disclosed that 90 percent had inflated incomes compared to
IRS documents, and “more disturbingly, almost 60 percent of the stated amounts were exaggerated
by more than 50 percent.”58 It seems unlikely that all of these borrowers could not document their
income, or that they would choose to pay up to 1.5 percent higher interest rate to get a stated-
income loan.59
3. Predatory Lending: Harmful, Widespread, and Legal
In this report, we are not able to quantify the increased risk of 
subprime foreclosures that stems from predatory lending prac-
tices. However, because it is widely acknowledged that most
predatory mortgage lending occurs in the subprime market, we
include it here as a point of discussion. 
Homeowners who are in
default on subprime
mortgages are particularly 
susceptible to foreclosure
rescue scams. 
“I hate to blame the mortgage 
companies because they are just
trying to make a living, but it seems
like almost anybody can get a 
mortgage these days. There are
people who get low interest [rates]
to start, but after two years it goes
away and they can’t afford it.”
Kent County (DE) Sheriff James Higdon,
who oversees the county’s monthly fore-
closure auctions. (“Mortgage Defaults Rise
with Debt Level,” The News Journal, March
19, 2006.)
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During the early period covered by our data, industry representatives often commented that predato-
ry lenders in the subprime market represented a few marginal players. However, in recent years,
more subprime lenders with significant market share have been the subject of governmental
enforcement and legal actions. Other subprime lenders have collapsed, often having been the sub-
ject of predatory lending allegations.60 It no longer seems reasonable to assume that predatory lend-
ing is perpetuated by “a few bad apples.” 
Representatives of the subprime industry often assert that customers in the subprime market freely
choose loans with risky features, such as deeply discounted initial interest rates on ARMs. But mort-
gage financing is a highly complex transaction, and lenders and brokers largely control the terms of
the loan. Moreover, they control information about the pricing of a wide variety of loan options
which typically is not disclosed to the consumer.61 It would be highly unusual for a potential mort-
gage applicant to tell a lender what kind of loan they qualify for and under what terms; most often,
the lender or broker makes that determination and presents it in the most appealing way possible. 
Predatory practices may be particularly relevant to the high level of ARMs originated in the sub-
prime market during recent times, when the rate differences between ARMs and fixed-rate loans
have been narrow. For example, today it is possible for a subprime borrower to lock in a fixed rate
for an additional 0.75%, or $93 a month, on a typical $175,000 loan. Credit-strapped borrowers
understandably seek loans with a low monthly payment, and it is likely that unscrupulous lenders
have been able to exploit the desire for manageable payments by using aggressive sales tactics to
push-market ARMs with temporarily low interest rates, even if these ultimately will become unaf-
fordable for the borrower.62 Even in cases where borrowers understand they are receiving a loan with
a variable rate, brokers or lenders can counter any hesitation by assuring them they will be able to
refinance when the rate rises. 
Not all predatory practices occur during loan origination: several subprime servicers have entered
settlements with regulators or are under investigation for predatory servicing practices, including
failure to post on-time borrower payments, charging excessive and unwarranted fees, prematurely
referring accounts to collections, and forcing homeowners into default to generate fee income.63 In
addition, homeowners who are in default on subprime mortgages are particularly susceptible to fore-
closure rescue scams. The perpetuators of these fraudulent transactions prey upon the vulnerability
of distressed borrowers, claiming to offer assistance, but instead tricking the borrowers into giving up
what little equity or cash they have left. The most common foreclosure rescue scams involve one of
three fraudulent schemes: first, phantom help where the “rescuer” charges outrageous fees for servic-
es that it never provides; second, a variety of supposed bailout schemes that never work, frequently
involving the homeowner’s surrender of the property title to the “rescuer,” and third, “bait and
switch,” in which the homeowner surrenders ownership without realizing it until it is too late.64
4. Third-Party Originators, the Secondary Market, and Lack of Oversight
Currently mortgage brokers originate about two-thirds of subprime mortgages.65 Brokers market to
prospective borrowers, assess a borrower’s creditworthiness, recommend loan products, and prepare
and submit loan applications to mortgage lenders, who fund the approved loans. When a loan 
closes, the broker collects a fee from the borrower, and may also collect a “yield-spread premium,”
which is a cash bonus a broker receives for charging a higher interest rate on a loan than the lender
required.66
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As a consequence, brokers have a direct incentive to steer borrowers into
excessively high interest rates, since higher rates produce higher premiums
for the broker. Advocates and policymakers have long expressed concerns
about abusive broker practices and excessive fees.67 Because brokers’ com-
pensation is based on making the loan, regardless of its risk of foreclosure,
they have little incentive to focus on the likely performance of the loan in
the future.68
While brokers focus on delivering a high volume of loans to lenders, lenders
typically sell these loans to investors, creating a “secondary market” in mort-
gage loans. The investor has the right to collect payments and enforce the
loan terms, including foreclosing on the home if the borrower defaults. The majority of subprime
loans are pooled together and then divided into tranches which are sold as securities to large num-
bers of investors. As of June 30, 2006, mortgage-backed securities were the largest segment of the
United States bond market, accounting for 23 percent of all bond market debt outstanding.69 
Like lenders, mortgage investors use sophisticated financial tools to limit their financial exposure to
losses from foreclosures. First, pools of loans in mortgage-backed securities typically contain both
high-risk and lower-risk loans, and the income on the better-performing loans subsidizes the losses
on defaulted loans. Second, mortgage-backed securities are often over-collateralized; that is, the
amount of the loans backing the investment is greater than its face value. Third, investors may
demand a premium from the lender/seller for investing in its subprime securities. Fourth, investors
are protected by a legal doctrine called “holder in due course” which prevents borrowers from mak-
ing claims against the purchaser of their loan, even if, for example, that loan contained abusive fea-
tures. 
Further, the only “regulatory” oversight of the secondary market comes from third-party rating agen-
cies, who evaluate the credit risk of mortgage-backed securities and award credit ratings that deter-
mine the market price for the security. However, rating agencies make no determination about “the
suitability of the underlying loans for individual borrowers.”70 At the end of the day, there is one
party always “on the hook” for a mortgage default: the homeowner.
As long as subprime foreclosures remain predictable, the secondary market structure helps brokers,
lenders, and investors minimize their risk of loss from defaults. Still, it is possible significantly high-
er foreclosures than predicted could lead to investor losses, and a decline in their appetite for sub-
prime loans. 
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
With billions of dollars in equity already lost, there is an urgent need to curtail foreclosures in 
the subprime market and mitigate homeowners’ losses in the future on unsustainable mortgages.
Here we offer recommendations to reduce the risk of foreclosure on new subprime loans, and help
subprime borrowers who currently are struggling to keep their homes: 
1. Establish that every borrower has the means to repay his/her loan—without resorting to 
selling the property or refinancing under pressure.
A fundamental purpose of loan underwriting is to confirm the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.
Without prudent underwriting, attempts to prevent foreclosure just rearrange the proverbial deck
chairs on the Titanic. Unfortunately, when qualifying borrowers, many subprime lenders, do not
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evaluate whether the applicant can afford the loan after introductory rates expire. This way of quali-
fying borrowers shows no concern for whether homeownership is sustainable. Since the dominant
subprime loan product is an exploding ARM with a significant rate adjustment after two years, many
borrowers with subprime mortgages will face insurmountable payment shock that could have been
avoided with sound underwriting.  
Federal and state banking regulators have recently issued guidance that, in the simplest terms, forbid
banks from using artificially low teaser rates to qualify borrowers who cannot truly afford the mort-
gage. Their guidance also addresses concerns about negatively amortizing loans (when loan pay-
ments do not result in lowering the principal amount owed) and approving loans without adequately
verifying the borrower s income. These principles should be applied to subprime loans, particularly
exploding ARMs.71
Subprime lenders should consider the ability of the borrower to pay their mortgage payments after
the initial teaser rate expires, taking into account projected interest rate increases that can occur. At
a minimum, lenders should not be permitted to underwrite loans based on an amount below the
expected fully-indexed, fully-amortizing monthly payment. In evaluating the borrower’s ability to
repay, lenders also should consider the given borrower’s circumstances, including the borrower’s
debt-to-income ratio (taking account of property taxes and insurance premiums) and the loan-to-
value ratio, as well as whether the loan combines multiple high-risk factors (e.g., a low down pay-
ment combined with an interest-only feature) that put the loan at a higher risk of foreclosure. 
In addition, two other practices that compound the risks posed by loose underwriting practices
should be curbed. First, subprime lenders should always escrow amounts for taxes and insurance.
Borrowers often are under the impression that these costs are included in their mortgage payment,
and are frequently unable to meet these significant additional costs when they come due as a lump
sum. Second, when underwriting subprime loans, lenders should independently verify income to
ensure that the borrower will be able to afford the payments.
2. Ensure that all parties operate in good faith, and that everyone, not just the borrower,  
has a stake in a successful loan outcome.
Mortgage Brokers: Investment professionals have long had an affirmative duty to ensure that the
products they recommend are suitable for their customers. Buying a home is the biggest investment
that most families ever make, and, since home equity is the major source of wealth for most families,
refinancing is a more relevant investment decision to most families than stock purchases. Arguably
today’s mortgage transactions are at least as complicated as financial decisions made with investment
professionals, yet families do not have a similar assurance that their lender or broker will deal fairly
with them by offering them loans that are suitable given their needs and circumstances. A securities
broker who steers a borrower into an inappropriate investment risks punishment; a mortgage broker
who does the same may reap higher compensation with no negative consequences. To protect home-
buyers and homeowners, lenders and brokers should be required to recommend loans that are suit-
able and reasonably advantageous for borrowers.72
Mortgage brokers, in particular, should have a fiduciary duty to use best efforts to obtain an appropri-
ate loan for the borrower. Borrowers expect their brokers to represent their best interests, and bro-
kers should be held to that standard. The stakes are too high to allow misplaced incentives to harm
families’ chances of paying a fair price for their home and building their net worth.                             
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Appraisers: Inflated appraisals help trap borrowers in unaffordable loans they cannot refinance. A
2003 National Appraisal Survey found that 55 percent of licensed appraisers had felt pressure from a
mortgage broker or lender to “hit a certain property value,” with 25 percent of appraisers saying this
happens almost half the time. Survey respondents also estimated that the majority of the appraisers
in their market would go along with requests to exaggerate the value or conditions of property most
of the time.73 Clearly, independence of the appraisal process is critical. Federal regulators have issued
guidance and other interagency statements over the last several years that provide sound appraisal
standards.74 Still, there remains room for tougher enforcement and greater regulatory oversight. 
Secondary Market Investors: Investors should take reasonable steps to avoid supporting unsound
lending, including refusing to purchase mortgages from lenders who make abusive loans and requir-
ing that subprime lenders use appropriate underwriting standards to ensure that borrowers can repay
the loan. Policymakers can encourage investors to support responsible lending by including reason-
able assignee liability provisions in protections for borrowers. Without effective assignee liability
provisions, a family that has been placed into an abusive loan in violation of the law often cannot
stop the foreclosure of their home. After going through foreclosure, most families lack the resources
necessary to pursue separate litigation. Policymakers can craft laws that balance protections for
homeowners and ensure good-faith secondary market participants do not face potentially significant
exposure. For example, New Mexico, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island all have adopted
balanced regulations that provide appropriate liability limits for investors who take appropriate steps
to avoid the purchase of loans from predatory lenders. 
3. Curtail steering by requiring objective pricing standards. 
As noted earlier in the report, the costs of subprime foreclosures fall heavily on African-American
and Latino homeowners, since subprime mortgages are disproportionately made in communities of
color. This impact is particular disturbing in light of earlier research by the Center for Responsible
Lending and others that has demonstrated that African-American and Latino borrowers are at
greater risk of receiving higher-rate loans than white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate
risk factors.75 Today, through advances in technology, lenders have a stronger ability than ever to
apply risk-based pricing. Increasing the fairness and objectivity of the subprime home loan origina-
tion process would significantly improve outcomes for all families. Given the many explicit ways
that American public policy supports homeownership and the increased risk of foreclosure in the
subprime market, it is especially important that borrowers representing equivalent risks receive simi-
lar treatment from mortgage professionals. We believe the best way to achieve this end is to elimi-
nate discretionary pricing in the subprime loan market, prompting lenders to adopt transparent,
market-driven prices for mortgages representing similar risks.76 
4. Continue to curtail equity-stripping practices such as abusive prepayment penalties.
While this study does not quantify the increased risk of subprime foreclosures that stems from 
predatory lending practices, it is obvious that when abusive fees and prepayment penalties associated
with predatory lending strip equity from the home, they limit borrowers’ options to refinance and
push borrowers into foreclosure more quickly. More steps should be taken to limit abuses related to
equity-stripping. For example, subprime loans should not include abusive prepayment penalties.
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Second, our previous research shows that state anti-predatory lending laws are working as intended,
i.e., lenders have responded by making subprime home loans that do not contain predatory terms
targeted by the laws.77 Policymakers should support legislation that builds on the proven methods for
protecting families from abusive lending. Recognizing that new lending abuses continue to emerge,
such laws should also ensure that all those responsible for representing and protecting families have
authority to act to address new problems. 
5. Help subprime borrowers who are in danger of losing their homes.
Servicing and Loss Mitigation: Many homeowners can save their homes if given opportunities for
reasonable work-out plans when they have trouble making their mortgage payments. However,
investors who purchase subprime loans in the secondary market often limit the flexibility that loan
servicers have to work with delinquent borrowers to avoid foreclosure, especially if this requires
extra time or money. As one Wall Street professional put it, “The general feeling among investors is
that they are not willing to trade . . . income for increased servicing costs.”78 In addition, settlements
in 2004 between regulators and subprime servicers Fairbanks Capital Corporation and Ocwen
Federal Bank disclosed numerous predatory servicing practices, including failure to post on-time bor-
rower payments, charging excessive and unwarranted fees, prematurely referring accounts to collec-
tions, and forcing homeowners into default to generate fee income. Regulators had hoped these set-
tlements would encourage other firms to establish servicing “best practices;” however, new FTC
investigations indicate this has not happened.79 Regulators must continue to focus on this area, espe-
cially on the way servicers handle adjustments of exotic ARM products and workout/collections
practices for a growing number of delinquent subprime loans.
Home Preservation Programs: There are efforts underway in numerous markets, often as partnerships
among community groups, lenders, and local or state governments, to help keep families in their
homes. These include an array of interventions to assist borrowers in trouble, including (1) targeted
outreach to delinquent borrowers, (2) financial counseling, (3) restructuring consumer debt, 
(4) funding unexpected home repairs (often the trigger for problems), (5) loan modifications, 
(6) short-term loans or grants to cover income shortfalls, (7) exit strategies if homeownership is
unsustainable due to divorce, health crisis, etc., and, if all else fails, (8) managing repossessed proper-
ty to avoid vacancies and maintain a stable neighborhood. Subsidies from state government can pro-
vide significant support to these kinds of programs, which often lack the scale to operate in an eco-
nomically sustainable way on their own.80 Even with public subsidy, however, these programs have a
limited ability to assist homeowners, particularly on the scale of foreclosures anticipated by this
report. Limiting abusive origination practices is critical to driving down the rate of foreclosure so
that intervention programs can provide service to borrowers with exceptional circumstances. 
Foreclosure Rescue Scams: As described in the Discussion section, rescue scams have proliferated,
stripping home equity and financial security from vulnerable borrowers, and accelerating the cycle of
decline that threatens whole communities.81 The danger from these predators will only grow as
delinquencies and foreclosures climb over the next few years. Several states, including California,
Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, and Missouri, have passed laws to protect homeowners from fraudu-
lent foreclosure rescuers. Other states should follow suit. 
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Previous Studies on Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures
First-generation mortgage foreclosure studies1 during the 1960s looked at foreclosures from the
lenders’ underwriting perspective; that is, how foreclosure risk was influenced by loan types, borrow-
er characteristics, and the amount of equity in a home (as measured by the loan-to-value ratio, or
LTV). Studies in the late 1970s through the 1980s further analyzed foreclosures based on borrower
behavior, describing an “option” model where default and prepayment were rational decisions by the
consumer based on their income, costs, and home equity. More recent studies incorporated the per-
spective of mortgage investors, who are concerned both with the rate of foreclosures and the expect-
ed default losses in a pool of loans. 
Despite differences in perspective and approach, economic studies and empirical research have iden-
tified several common factors that increase the likelihood of default and foreclosure. A central role
is played by the amount of equity a borrower has in his home, determined by the current loan-to-
value ratio. For example, a study of conventional loans originated from 1975-1983 and purchased by
Freddie Mac showed that loans with downpayments of five percent had default rates that were dou-
ble those of loans with 10 or 15 percent downpayments.2
While home equity is a dominant factor in mortgage foreclosures, studies indicate borrower charac-
teristics play a role as well, although there is some disagreement as to the level of importance for
specific characteristics. (The fact that many of these characteristics—for example, the amount of
other financial assets held by a borrower—must be deduced through proxy measurements rather than
actual data makes this analysis quite difficult.)  One factor, the variability of household income, con-
sistently shows an effect on mortgage default and delinquency.3  Further, studies of affordable housing
loans made in the early 1990s demonstrated that “layered” mortgage risk factors could quickly esca-
late default rates: for example, high debt-to-income payment ratios (above the then-standard 33/38)
multiplied the default rate 3.6 times, turning a typical 6 percent default rate on a conventional 5-
percent down loan into a 20 percent default rate.4
The lender’s cost to foreclose also affects whether they will opt for foreclosure or try to work with
delinquent borrowers. Foreclosures are more likely to occur in states with shorter foreclosure periods,
or where lenders can pursue non-judicial foreclosures or obtain deficiency judgments against borrow-
ers to recover default losses.)5
1 Characterizations from Residential Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, Roberto G. Quercia and  Michael A. Stegman, Journal of Housing Research -
Volume 3 Issue 2  (1992).  
2 Robert Van Order and Peter Zorn. Income,Location and Default: Some Implications for Community Lending, Real Estate Economics 28 (2000).
3 J.P. Herzog and J.S. Early, Home Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure, National Bureau of Economic Research (1970). T. Campbell and J. Dietrich, The
Determinants of Default on Conventional Residential  Mortgages, Journal of Finances 38 (5) (1983). 
4 Michael K. Stamper, Revisting Targeted-Affordable Lending, Secondary Mortgage Markets (October 1997). Gordon H. Steinbach, Ready to Make the Grade, Mortgage
Banking (June 1995). 
5 T.M. Clauretie, A Note on Mortgage Risk: Default vs. Loss Rate, Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 18 (2) (1990).  
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Studies show that delinquencies and defaults occur on subprime loans for many of the same reasons
as past-due prime loans: lower FICO scores and higher loan-to-value ratios—especially in markets
with poor housing appreciation.6 The presence of predatory loan terms such as prepayment penalties
or balloon payments also increases odds that subprime loans will default.7 Overall, subprime mortgage
loans have much higher default rates than prime loans. One study reported that in the 28th month of
a loan, a typical subprime loan defaults more than 8 times more often than a typical prime loan (with
a range of 3.5 to 12 times more often, depending upon the credit score of the borrower).8
In two other recent analyses of subprime mortgages, researchers analyzed the propensity of subprime
adjustable rate mortgages and fixed rate mortgages to foreclose. The first study examined a large set of
subprime loans originated from 1998 to 2005, and reported that at the end of five years almost 18
percent of the loans had defaulted.9 Similarly, using a large database of securitized subprime loans
originated by retail lenders in 1999, other researchers reported that 20.7 percent of subprime loans
they examined from that year had experienced a foreclosure at least once within five years of origina-
tion.10
6 Michelle A. Danis and Anthony N. Pennington-Cross, A Dynamic Look at Subprime Loan Performance, FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005-029A (May
2005).  
7 Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman, Walter R. Davis, The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subrpime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties 
and Balloon Payments, Center for  Community Capitalism, Kenan Institute for Private Enterprise, University of North Carolina at Chapel  Hill (January 2005).  
8 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Patterns of Default and Prepayment for Prime and Nonprime Mortgages. OFHEO Working Paper 02-1 (2002).
9 Anthony Pennington-Cross and Giang Ho, The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed Rate Mortgages, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 042-
A (July 2006). They define a loan as  in default once foreclosure is initiated of when it is deemed real estate owned by the lender.
10 See Note 7. 
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Appendix 2: Methods and Limitations 
In this appendix, we describe the methods used to arrive at each finding and the limitations
entailed in both the procedures and the data used. All statistical procedures were executed in SAS
9.1.3 SAS/STAT© and SAS/ETS© modules.
Finding A1.
Prepaid loans were defined as loans with a balance that went to zero when the preceding month
showed that loan to have a status other than foreclosure, bankruptcy, or Real Estate Owned by the
lender (REO). The latter category most commonly represents mortgages where the home has been
signed over to the lender to avoid foreclosure, sometimes referred to as a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure.
Foreclosed loans were defined as loans with a balance that went to zero when the preceding month
showed the loan to have a status of foreclosure, bankruptcy, or REO. These definitions are imper-
fect in the sense that some small number of loans that are coded as foreclosures and associated with,
for example, a bankruptcy status may actually represent refinances and, conversely, some loans that
achieve a zero balance while, for example, 90 days delinquent may actually represent a foreclosure.
Nevertheless, we believe these are reasonable standards for implementing generally understood defi-
nitions of prepayment and foreclosure.
Table 3 simply represents a tabulation of the incidence of these outcomes observed in the loan-level
dataset used in this study. Figure 2 presents the cumulative accumulation of foreclosures for each
annual cohort of subprime loans by the age of loans from that cohort at the time their balance is set
to zero. We also include immediately below this paragraph a cumulative foreclosure curve condi-
tional on non-prepayment. By drawing the foreclosure curves conditional on non-prepayment, the
figure below is essentially presenting the cumulative foreclosure rate that would be expected if no
loans prepaid and all loans experienced the odds of foreclosure associated with loans that did not
prepay. This cumulative conditional curve is shown below and allows one to observe marked differ-
ences between the 1998 and 1999 loans, on one hand, and the loans from 2000 onward on the other:
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Finding A2.
In this section, we simply expand the range of measurements used to evaluate patterns of borrower
distress. The definitions used are straightforward. A loan is counted as “ever delinquent” if, at any
point, payment status was listed as 30 days past due. A loan is counted as “ever foreclosed” if it ever
achieved a payment status of foreclosed, bankruptcy, or REO. It is worth noting that foreclosed here
means that the loan entered foreclosure status and not that it finished foreclosure. A loan is counted
as “prepaid in distress” if its balance went to zero when the preceding month showed a status of 30
or more days delinquent but not in foreclosure, bankruptcy, or REO.
Finding A3.
To develop the relationships in Table 5, we estimated robust regression models (PROC ROBUS-
TREG) for several annual cohorts of subprime loans. In each case, the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of the odds of a given outcome. For example, if the outcome of interest is foreclo-
sure, the dependent variable is the log of the odds a loan will be foreclosed or, in other words,
ln(P/(1-P)) where P is the probability that a loan will be foreclosed. The independent variable in all
models is the average housing price appreciation in the MSA measured at the loan-level for loans
belonging to the annual cohort being modeled from origination until time of termination or, if still
outstanding at the time, until May 2005. The unit of observation for the regression is an MSA. The
results presented in Table 5 have been transformed to odds ratios. The correct interpretation of the
coefficients presented is that they show the expected change to the odds ratio that results from a
one-percentage point change in annual house price appreciation (HPA). For example, for loans
originated in 2000, let X1 be the annualized HPA for MSA1, X2 be the annual HPA for MSA2, Y1 be
the odds of foreclosure for loans in MSA1, and Y2 be the odds of foreclosure for loans in MSA2. 
If X2-X1=1%, then (Y2-Y1)/Y1=-8.32%.
The simplicity of this approach is one of its strengths. By observing outcomes on millions of sub-
prime loans across hundreds of geographies and several annual cohorts, we essentially allow loan-
level variations in credit quality to become random noise, allowing us to observe the correlation
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between appreciation and a given outcome of interest. These findings, however, are not without
their limitations. For example, we do not control for the effects of differing legal environments, the
possibility that ineffective servicers may have a geographic nexus, or the effects from different inter-
est rate environments. Nevertheless, since our results are largely consistent across multiple annual
cohorts and highly significant, we believe that none of these limitations are fatal to our analysis. 
Also, while option theory widely used to model prepayment and defaults in mortgages squarely sug-
gests that lower appreciation rates should be associated with increased defaults, we also do not claim
that our results purely represent the effects of such appreciation. Indeed, numerous factors such as
unemployment and/or population change can be correlated with housing price appreciation rates
and we include no such controls. In this case, however, our goal is not to understand the precise
relationship of housing price appreciation to default, but rather to use it as an instrument for projec-
tions.
Finding A4.
The observed foreclosures presented in Table 6 are tabulated directly from the dataset. The projec-
tions presented in Table 6 are based on a modified life table method. Life tables are generally used
to allow one to understand the probability of experiencing a given outcome. They are commonly
used in the life insurance industry, for example, to estimate the risk of mortality for an insured.
To construct our life table, we used observations from all subprime loans originated at least 60
months prior to May 2005, following their performance for 89 months after origination. Fitch loss
timing assumptions indicates that 97.5 percent of subprime loan losses will be incurred by 89
months of age.1 We discarded any additional potential foreclosures as trivial additions and deem the
experience through 89 months to be equivalent to the entire cumulative experience rate. There are
three possible performance outcomes over this time period: outstanding, prepaid, or foreclosed. For
any given month i, let ai be the number of loans still outstanding at the beginning of the month. Let
bi be the number of loans foreclosed between month i and month 89. Then the probability of fore-
closure after month i is given by
qi = bi / ai
which is, in other words, the probability that a loan that has obtained a given month will be fore-
closed by the 89th month.
The life table itself contains 5 columns. The first column is the age of the loan observed. The sec-
ond column is the average housing appreciation associated with loans in our sample that obtained
that age before foreclosing, measured at origination through the earlier of termination or May 2005.
The third column presents the average proportion of original principal balance of loans in our sam-
ple that had obtained a given age by May 2005. The fourth column is the average age at foreclosure
among loans that had foreclosed by May 2005 for loans that had obtained a given age in our sample.
The fifth column is the probability that loans that have obtained that age will foreclose by month
89, as discussed above.
1 Projections are made through the 89th month of the loan life. At this point, the vast majority of subprime  loans have typically terminated, though some small
additional number of foreclosures are always possible. See e.g., Fitch Ratings Agency, U.S. R.M.B.S. Intex-Based Cash Flow Model, 2006 (available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=282286) (showing subprime loss timing assumptions that 97.46% of losses have been
occurred by month 89). 
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1 8.7 0.985 43 0.114
2 8.7 0.985 43 0.114
3 8.7 0.985 43 0.114
4 8.7 0.985 43 0.114
5 8.7 0.985 43 0.114
6 8.7 0.985 43 0.115
7 8.7 0.985 43 0.115
8 8.7 0.985 43 0.116
9 8.7 0.985 43 0.117
10 8.7 0.985 43 0.117
11 8.7 0.985 43 0.118
12 8.7 0.985 43 0.119
13 8.7 0.985 43 0.120
14 8.7 0.985 43 0.121
15 8.7 0.985 43 0.123
16 8.7 0.985 43 0.124
17 8.7 0.985 43 0.126
18 8.7 0.985 44 0.127
19 8.7 0.985 44 0.128
20 8.7 0.984 44 0.128
21 8.7 0.984 44 0.129
22 8.7 0.984 45 0.129
23 8.7 0.984 45 0.130
24 8.7 0.984 45 0.130
25 8.7 0.983 46 0.130
26 8.6 0.983 46 0.131
27 8.5 0.983 47 0.132
28 8.3 0.983 47 0.134
29 8.3 0.982 48 0.135
30 8.2 0.982 48 0.135
31 8.2 0.982 49 0.135
32 8.1 0.982 49 0.135
33 8.1 0.981 50 0.135
34 8.0 0.981 50 0.135
35 7.9 0.981 51 0.134
36 7.9 0.980 51 0.134
37 7.9 0.980 52 0.133
38 7.9 0.980 52 0.133
39 7.7 0.979 53 0.132
40 7.7 0.979 54 0.132
41 7.6 0.978 54 0.131
42 7.5 0.978 55 0.130
43 7.5 0.977 55 0.129
44 7.4 0.977 56 0.127
45 7.3 0.977 57 0.125
Loan Age
(months)
HPA Original
Principal
Balance
Remaining (%)
Average Age at
Foreclosure (in
Months)
Probability of
Foreclosure
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46 7.2 0.976 57 0.124
47 7.1 0.976 58 0.122
48 7.1 0.975 58 0.120
49 7.0 0.975 59 0.117
50 6.8 0.974 59 0.115
51 6.7 0.974 60 0.112
52 6.7 0.973 61 0.109
53 6.6 0.973 61 0.106
54 6.6 0.972 62 0.103
55 6.5 0.972 62 0.099
56 6.5 0.971 63 0.096
57 6.4 0.971 64 0.093
58 6.3 0.970 65 0.088
59 6.3 0.970 65 0.084
60 6.3 0.969 66 0.079
61 6.2 0.968 67 0.075
62 6.2 0.968 68 0.072
63 6.2 0.967 68 0.070
64 6.2 0.966 69 0.067
65 6.2 0.966 70 0.065
66 6.2 0.965 71 0.062
67 6.2 0.964 71 0.059
68 6.2 0.963 72 0.056
69 6.2 0.962 73 0.053
70 6.2 0.962 73 0.051
71 6.2 0.961 74 0.048
72 6.2 0.960 75 0.045
73 6.2 0.960 76 0.041
74 6.2 0.959 77 0.037
75 6.2 0.958 78 0.034
76 6.2 0.957 79 0.032
77 6.2 0.957 79 0.030
78 6.2 0.955 80 0.027
79 6.2 0.955 81 0.025
80 6.2 0.954 82 0.023
81 6.3 0.953 83 0.020
82 6.3 0.953 83 0.017
83 6.3 0.952 84 0.015
84 6.3 0.951 85 0.012
85 6.3 0.952 86 0.010
86 6.3 0.953 86 0.008
87 6.3 0.954 87 0.004
88 6.1 0.959 88 0.002
89 6.1 0.959 89 0.000
Loan Age
(months)
HPA Original
Principal
Balance
Remaining (%)
Average Age at
Foreclosure 
(in Months)
Probability of
Foreclosure
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Next, to apply the life table, we modified it to take into account the change in foreclosure rates that
would be expected for differing housing price appreciation rates associated with annual cohort as fol-
low:
Let Yi be the projected probability of foreclosure for loans with age of month i, Xi be the observed
odds of foreclosure for loans with age of month i, then,
and ß is the coefficient obtained from our robust regression model for the year 2000 cohort.
Expectations for housing price appreciation used to modify the life table are drawn first from the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) housing price index and then pegged to
the average annual housing price appreciation based on a five-year MSA-level forecast from Moody’s
Economy.Com in its report “Housing at the Tipping Point” (October 2006). Loans outside of MSA
were assigned a housing price appreciation equal to the average of appreciation in the state’s MSAs.
Projections for 2005 and 2006 also assume that the proportion of loans within each state’s MSA and
non-MSA areas remained constant from 2004 to 2006.
The modified life table was then applied to the loans not prepaid or foreclosed as of May 2005 to
project future totals at the loan level. We then sum the observed foreclosures and projected foreclo-
sures derived from the life table at the loan level to the geography of interest (e.g., MSA, state, or
national level).
Losses were estimated at the loan level by multiplying the probability of default for each loan by the
expected loss on foreclosure. The expected loss on foreclosure was based on three factors: the cost to
dispose of the property, transaction costs, and a discount to the property’s fair market value occa-
sioned by the general desire to prioritize reselling a foreclosed loan quickly. Following Calem and
LaCour-Little,2 it is assumed that it costs 10 percent of unpaid balance to dispose the property and 5
percent of unpaid balance for foreclosure transaction costs. According to Christopher L. Cagan,
“Foreclosing lenders do not want to incur extended additional costs of insurance, taxes, and mainte-
nance for their foreclosed properties. They want to resell these properties quickly and recoup some
money through the resale. Thus, lenders typically accept sale prices reduced by a percentage that
will be called the ‘foreclosure discount.’”3 In our study, foreclosure discount is estimated by using a
regression model developed by Pennington-Cross.4 We applied the findings from those authors’ mod-
els in our estimation, and all independent variables are standardized to a zero-mean. The average of
the estimated foreclosure discount for our data is higher than the average reported by Pennington-
Cross, because our loans are all subprime, while his loans are prime loans oversampled toward higher
interest loans. Pennington-Cross reported an average of 22 percent for a foreclosure discount. We
standardized our estimate to this average. For all the loans observed foreclosed, equity loss is calcu-
lated directly. For loans projected to foreclose, we use the average age at foreclosure and associated
balance at that age in the life table to project losses.
where
2 Paul S Calem and Michael LaCour-Little, Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Mortgage Loans, FEDS working paper 2001-60 (November 2001).  
3 Christopher Cagan, A Ripple Not a Tidal Wave: Foreclosure Prevalence and Foreclosure Discount, First American Real Estate Solutions (November 16, 2006).  
4 Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Value of Foreclosed Property, The Journal of Real Estate Research (April-June 2006).  
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The life table constructed here has limitations worth noting. Since only loans with more than 60
months’ history are included in the life table and our observation data set ended in May 2005, only
loans from 1998, 1999, and 2000 are included in the life table. Yet these cohorts are not identical to
later years. For example, they have markedly fewer ARM and interest-only loans. Consequently, the life
table constructed here will not fully capture the elevated risk posed by increased proportions of ARM
loans, loans with an interest only feature, or by the growing acceptance on low and no documentation
of income loans. We believe, based in part on Finding B and the descriptive statistics in Appendix 3,
that these omissions tend to make our life tables conservative in that they tend to predict foreclosures
based on a set of loans with features associated with lower risk of foreclosure.
We also note some limitations on the estimated losses associated with foreclosures. Our dataset does not
provide a combined loan-to-value ratio that measures the total amount of debt on the secured property
when borrowers hold both a first-lien mortgage and a subordinate lien. As a result, we cannot provide
direct estimates of how much equity borrowers hold at the time their loans are terminated. This means
that some unknown portion of the losses associated with foreclosures may exceed borrowers’ net equity
(down payment plus principal payments plus appreciation) at the time of foreclosure. In a number of
jurisdictions, lenders who foreclose can pursue a deficiency judgment against borrowers to attempt to
recover the amount of losses that exceed the available equity. However, we have no direct measurement
of the proportion of foreclosures in which lenders pursue such judgments, and, consequently, throughout
the report we qualify our loss estimates.
Finding A5.
The findings presented in Table 7 and Table 8 are straightforward attempts to develop expectations for
cumulative foreclosure rates for borrowers who experience multiple subprime loan cycles. As detailed in
the text and the referenced source, the assumptions underlying Table 7 are that (1) 60 percent of 
borrowers who refinance a subprime loan will receive another subprime loan; (2) using the 2005-2006
cumulative projected foreclosure rate 19.4 percent of loans are foreclosed; and (3) that these probabili-
ties are constant for borrowers across multiple loans.
Finding B.
These MSA projections were made using the modified life table methodology discussed above for find-
ing A4.
Finding C.
The findings presented in Table 9 are based on a series of proportional hazard models. In each model,
our independent variables are a variable of interest (e.g., less than full documentation of income) and
the borrower s credit score. The models are then developed as follows:
For a sample of n subprime loans, for each individual loan i, let ti be the time of foreclosed or the time
of censoring due to either prepaid or still outstanding as of May 2005, Ci be an indicator variable with a
value of 1 if it is uncensored or a value of 0 if it is censored at ti, xi be a vector of k covariate values, and
ß be a vector of coefficients.
The ratio of the hazard of foreclosure for two loans i and j, is given by
where
The coefficients are estimated by maximizing the partial log likelihood, which is given by
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VARIABLE Value 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
PURPOSE Purchase 30.45 31.55 38.47 35.21 32.84 32.09 39.50
Refi (Cash Out) 47.03 51.85 49.65 52.06 52.55 53.70 50.80
Refi (No Cash Out) 20.12 15.06 11.75 12.71 14.61 14.20 9.68
Other 2.39 1.54 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02
PROP_TYPE SFR 84.15 84.95 82.18 81.74 80.05 78.86 76.12
CONDO/Townhouse 4.46 4.30 4.66 4.82 5.40 5.97 6.89
Else 0.94 0.38 0.27 0.31 0.13 0.07 0.06
2+Units 3.69 3.83 4.10 3.76 4.45 4.54 4.39
PUD 5.36 4.39 5.99 7.23 8.52 9.65 11.72
Manufactured Hsng 1.40 2.15 2.81 2.14 1.45 0.91 0.83
PROD_TYPE Fixed 59.64 46.61 39.91 42.08 37.61 39.35 25.29
IO 0.02 0.05 0.32 0.30 1.66 5.74 19.64
ARM 32.28 41.97 52.73 52.52 58.60 54.15 54.93
Balloon 8.04 11.27 6.95 5.08 2.14 0.75 0.14
DOCUMENT Full 67.04 75.08 74.06 69.91 65.58 61.92 59.04
Else 32.96 24.92 25.94 30.09 34.42 38.08 40.96
PP_PEN No 45.63 33.92 31.37 31.59 28.30 31.26 34.77
Yes 54.37 66.08 68.63 68.41 71.70 68.74 65.23
PMI No PMI 89.28 80.99 73.25 65.56 69.35 76.62 86.66
PMI 10.72 19.01 26.75 34.44 30.65 23.38 13.34
JUMBO Below 90.56 93.55 91.27 85.79 86.89 88.13 85.96
Above 9.44 6.45 8.73 14.21 13.11 11.87 14.04
STEER Else 86.11 88.30 90.09 87.26 86.40 85.17 84.61
FICO>=660 and Full Doc 13.89 11.70 9.91 12.74 13.60 14.83 15.39
LTV <65 14.70 12.71 11.27 10.72 11.11 12.16 10.72
65-70 10.11 9.48 8.88 7.52 7.17 6.99 6.62
71-75 13.94 12.65 11.25 9.82 9.25 8.50 8.16
76-80 29.72 29.55 28.08 27.86 29.58 29.14 38.62
81-85 12.67 14.78 13.84 13.96 12.47 10.28 8.74
86-90 11.97 14.04 15.65 17.19 16.73 16.01 13.69
91-95 2.53 2.97 4.84 6.85 7.75 9.06 7.93
96-100 2.60 2.46 3.43 4.13 4.12 6.67 5.15
>100 1.19 1.13 1.46 1.90 1.83 1.18 0.38
FICO 300-499 3.00 3.20 3.67 2.06 1.18 0.35 0.08
500-549 13.78 17.10 19.85 16.46 14.77 12.25 11.48
550-599 21.94 26.55 27.92 24.41 22.75 20.30 19.07
600-649 22.03 25.37 24.85 26.24 26.82 27.52 26.74
650-699 18.52 16.57 13.65 16.70 18.24 21.09 22.48
700-850 20.51 11.21 10.07 14.13 16.23 18.48 20.15
REGION FWST 21.65 17.86 18.22 22.82 26.88 29.59 31.38
GLAK 17.10 19.63 19.04 17.41 15.44 13.81 12.75
MEST 12.75 12.36 11.41 10.63 11.66 12.40 12.11
NENG 3.90 4.41 4.42 4.57 5.03 5.55 4.96
PLNS 5.23 5.62 6.02 5.98 5.88 5.24 4.66
RKMT 5.99 4.73 4.44 4.67 4.38 3.77 3.88
SEST 23.57 25.02 25.22 23.57 21.11 20.55 20.91
SWST 9.80 10.38 11.24 10.36 9.63 9.09 9.35
TOTAL Counts 429,025 513,434 449,401 587,942 866,019 1,405,931 2,172,465
(All figures are percentages except for last row in table.)
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics. Distribution of owner-occupied and 1st lien loans by year of origination in the proprietary dataset
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Cumulative Projected Foreclosure Rate (%)
State 1998-2001 2006 
Alaska 10.8 17.1
Alabama 16.2 16.5
Arkansas 16.4 18.8
Arizona 10.5 21.1
California 4.5 21.4
Colorado 13.2 19.6
Connecticut 8.2 13.9
District of Columbia 6.8 22.8
Delaware 9.2 14.5
Florida 10.1 16.9
Georgia 17.9 20.3
Hawaii 5.0 20.6
Iowa 16.5 18.5
Idaho 15.8 18.3
Illinois 13.3 19.2
Indiana 19.0 17.9
Kansas 15.3 19.9
Kentucky 16.4 18.9
Louisiana* 15.1 19.6
Massachusetts 5.6 17.6
Maryland 7.8 20.6
Maine 8.5 16.4
Michigan 14.4 18.1
Minnesota 10.0 20.0
Missouri 17.1 18.5
Mississippi* 18.6 18.3
Montana 12.5 18.3
North Carolina 15.5 17.5
North Dakota 15.4 17.8
Nebraska 16.2 18.3
New Hampshire 5.4 14.9
New Jersey 7.6 19.6
New Mexico 13.4 17.3
Nevada 11.5 23.7
New York 9.7 20.9
Ohio 16.2 18.1
Oklahoma 19.5 17.8
Oregon 14.3 19.6
Pennsylvania 11.2 17.1
Rhode Island 4.8 19.5
South Carolina 15.0 17.4
South Dakota 10.2 18.7
Tennessee 17.7 17.6
Texas 14.4 17.3
Utah 20.7 19.7
Virginia 8.3 20.9
Vermont 9.8 20.7
Washington 13.0 16.8
Wisconsin 12.6 19.6
West Virginia 14.3 19.2
Wyoming 10.1 17.5
Appendix 4: Projected Lifetime Foreclosure Rates by State for Subprime Loans Originated
in 1998-2001 and 2006 
* Our models do not
account for the 
potential impact 
of Hurricane Katrina
on foreclosure rates.
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Alabama Anniston-Oxford, AL 12.5% 15.8% 299 27.1% 169
Auburn-Opelika, AL 18.3% 17.6% 152 -3.7% 308
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 15.2% 16.5% 258 8.8% 243
Columbus, GA-AL 14.8% 17.0% 222 14.9% 210
Decatur, AL 17.2% 14.9% 337 -13.3% 338
Dothan, AL 21.2% 15.4% 321 -27.3% 371
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL 19.0% 14.0% 354 -26.3% 368
Gadsden, AL 14.1% 15.8% 299 12.5% 224
Huntsville, AL 15.4% 16.0% 293 3.5% 268
Mobile, AL 15.4% 17.6% 152 14.4% 212
Montgomery, AL 19.6% 16.9% 230 -13.6% 340
Tuscaloosa, AL 13.9% 15.5% 315 11.3% 230
Alaska Anchorage, AK 10.9% 17.1% 205 57.0% 103
Fairbanks, AK 15.2% 16.7% 250 9.9% 236
Arizona Flagstaff, AZ 6.9% 12.0% 368 75.4% 71
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 9.9% 21.1% 26 113.5% 53
Prescott, AZ 8.7% 19.6% 51 124.1% 48
Tucson, AZ 9.3% 21.6% 19 132.4% 45
Yuma, AZ 9.3% 16.7% 250 79.8% 68
Arkansas Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 14.5% 18.4% 97 27.0% 170
Fort Smith, AR-OK 21.5% 15.8% 299 -26.2% 367
Hot Springs, AR 12.8% 17.1% 205 33.5% 150
Jonesboro, AR 18.5% 15.2% 329 -18.2% 350
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 15.4% 17.4% 182 12.9% 223
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 18.9% 17.9% 129 -5.1% 312
Pine Bluff, AR 15.0% 15.8% 299 5.7% 260
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 19.6% 14.8% 339 -24.4% 364
California Bakersfield, CA 9.3% 24.2% 2 159.8% 39
Chico, CA 6.0% 20.2% 40 238.1% 25
El Centro, CA 6.9% 13.5% 360 96.2% 62
Fresno, CA 8.3% 23.5% 5 185.0% 36
Hanford-Corcoran, CA 8.9% 17.6% 152 98.4% 61
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 6.0% 22.0% 15 268.5% 22
Madera, CA 6.4% 20.9% 29 227.0% 28
Merced, CA 6.4% 25.0% 1 288.6% 20
Modesto, CA 5.9% 17.1% 205 189.4% 35
Napa, CA 2.6% 16.4% 267 526.5% 5
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 4.6% 21.3% 24 358.9% 11
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 3.2% 17.6% 152 453.1% 7
Redding, CA 8.7% 19.7% 47 127.4% 46
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 7.0% 22.6% 11 224.0% 29
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 4.8% 21.0% 28 338.5% 14
Salinas, CA 4.0% 20.4% 34 413.1% 9
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 3.2% 21.4% 21 567.4% 3
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 3.0% 16.7% 250 462.1% 6
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 4.3% 19.3% 60 352.3% 13
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA 2.6% 13.6% 359 415.6% 8
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 3.0% 22.8% 9 668.3% 1
Appendix 5: Projected Lifetime Foreclosure Rates for 378 MSAs (Comparing 1998-2001 and 2006 Subprime Loans)
State MSA
1998-2001
Loans
2006
Loans
Rank
2006
Change
1998-2001
to 2006
Rank by
Change
from 1998-
2001 to
2006
Center for Responsible Lending        49
State MSA
1998-2001
Loans 
2006
Loans
Rank
2006
Change
1998-2001
to 2006
Rank by
Change
from 1998-
2001 to
2006
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA 2.8% 19.6% 51 595.5% 2
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 3.2% 14.5% 347 356.3% 12
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 3.4% 21.1% 26 526.9% 4
Stockton, CA 6.7% 23.4% 7 249.8% 24
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 4.7% 23.8% 3 404.9% 10
Visalia-Porterville, CA 10.8% 22.2% 13 105.9% 55
Yuba City, CA 8.0% 17.6% 152 120.1% 50
Colorado Boulder, CO 6.6% 16.8% 238 153.4% 42
Colorado Springs, CO 11.4% 18.4% 97 61.5% 98
Denver-Aurora, CO 10.3% 20.6% 30 100.0% 60
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 7.0% 15.8% 299 127.0% 47
Grand Junction, CO 8.9% 19.2% 63 116.7% 51
Greeley, CO 10.4% 19.5% 57 87.7% 66
Pueblo, CO 16.4% 17.5% 165 6.9% 255
Connecticut Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 6.7% 10.5% 377 56.4% 104
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 10.0% 14.2% 352 42.1% 131
New Haven-Milford, CT 12.1% 16.0% 293 31.6% 154
Norwich-New London, CT 10.2% 15.1% 332 47.6% 122
Delaware Dover, DE 11.8% 17.6% 152 49.1% 118
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 10.9% 14.1% 353 28.7% 165
D.C. Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 8.2% 22.8% 9 177.9% 38
Florida Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 13.3% 14.4% 349 8.3% 245
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 12.4% 15.4% 321 24.1% 179
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 9.5% 17.9% 129 88.4% 64
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL 10.8% 15.6% 310 44.5% 127
Gainesville, FL 11.3% 18.0% 122 60.1% 99
Jacksonville, FL 15.8% 16.1% 287 1.8% 278
Lakeland, FL 16.8% 10.9% 375 -35.1% 375
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 12.0% 19.6% 51 63.5% 94
Naples-Marco Island, FL 7.5% 13.2% 364 74.9% 73
Ocala, FL 13.2% 17.0% 222 28.9% 164
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 12.2% 18.8% 80 54.6% 108
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 11.6% 16.4% 267 42.0% 132
Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL 15.6% 9.9% 378 -36.6% 377
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 16.0% 14.0% 354 -12.8% 336
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL 9.8% 11.5% 373 16.9% 199
Punta Gorda, FL 12.4% 15.3% 325 23.6% 182
Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL 8.9% 15.6% 310 75.1% 72
Tallahassee, FL 13.4% 14.0% 354 4.1% 266
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 12.4% 16.8% 238 35.6% 148
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 8.5% 14.4% 349 68.8% 82
Georgia Albany, GA 15.9% 16.1% 287 0.8% 281
Athens-Clarke County, GA 11.8% 17.3% 192 45.8% 125
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 15.1% 16.2% 283 7.4% 252
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 17.0% 16.7% 250 -1.9% 297
Brunswick, GA 14.4% 16.3% 277 13.5% 218
Chattanooga, TN-GA 17.4% 18.1% 112 4.2% 265
Columbus, GA-AL 14.8% 17.0% 222 14.9% 210
Dalton, GA 16.6% 18.0% 122 8.8% 244
Gainesville, GA 11.4% 19.1% 69 67.3% 86
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State MSA
Rank
2006
Change
1998-2001
to 2006
Rank by
Change
from 1998-
2001 to
2006
Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA 17.1% 18.3% 104 6.7% 256
Macon, GA 18.8% 16.5% 258 -11.9% 330
Rome, GA 18.3% 16.3% 277 -10.9% 327
Savannah, GA 12.2% 18.7% 84 53.0% 110
Valdosta, GA 22.7% 16.5% 258 -27.1% 370
Warner Robins, GA 15.3% 17.1% 205 12.1% 225
Hawaii Honolulu, HI 7.9% 20.6% 30 158.9% 41
Idaho Boise City-Nampa, ID 17.2% 18.5% 90 8.0% 248
Coeur d'Alene, ID 16.4% 17.9% 129 9.1% 240
Idaho Falls, ID 17.1% 17.1% 205 0.5% 282
Lewiston, ID-WA 23.3% 19.6% 51 -16.0% 347
Logan, UT-ID 16.9% 17.1% 205 1.4% 280
Pocatello, ID 22.6% 16.9% 230 -25.1% 366
Illinois Bloomington-Normal, IL 13.4% 18.8% 80 40.0% 136
Champaign-Urbana, IL 15.4% 21.3% 24 38.4% 140
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 14.0% 19.2% 63 37.0% 144
Danville, IL 18.1% 18. 0% 122 -0.5% 288
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 16.1% 18.9% 75 17.8% 195
Decatur, IL 22.3% 16.0% 293 -28.6% 373
Kankakee-Bradley, IL 25.5% 20.4% 34 -19.7% 355
Peoria, IL 21.8% 18.8% 80 -13.8% 341
Rockford, IL 18.2% 21.4% 21 17.5% 196
Springfield, IL 19.0% 18.7% 84 -1.8% 296
St. Louis, MO-IL 17.4% 17.5% 165 0.5% 283
Indiana Anderson, IN 24.1% 18.1% 112 -24.7% 365
Bloomington, IN 16.5% 17.1% 205 3.7% 267
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 16.1% 17.4% 182 8.2% 246
Columbus, IN 16.7% 17.1% 205 2.8% 272
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 18.2% 18.7% 84 2.6% 274
Evansville, IN-KY 21.0% 17.6% 152 -15.8% 346
Fort Wayne, IN 21.7% 17.4% 182 -19.9% 357
Gary, IN 16.6% 17.9% 129 8.0% 247
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 22.1% 16.9% 230 -23.6% 363
Kokomo, IN 17.1% 19.1% 69 11.5% 229
Lafayette, IN 17.9% 17.4% 182 -2.7% 301
Louisville-Jefferson County, KY-IN 16.3% 18.5% 90 13.9% 215
Michigan City-La Porte, IN 14.6% 18.5% 90 26.8% 171
Muncie, IN 19.5% 17.9% 129 -8.0% 321
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 20.5% 16.7% 250 -18.8% 352
Terre Haute, IN 21.4% 17.5% 165 -18.2% 351
Iowa Ames, IA 11.1% 17.5% 165 58.1% 101
Cedar Rapids, IA 15.4% 17.8% 141 15.2% 207
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 16.1% 18.9% 75 17.8% 195
Moines-West Des Moines, IA 14.6% 18.9% 75 29.9% 157
Dubuque, IA 15.0% 16.7% 250 11.0% 231
Iowa City, IA 15.5% 18.1% 112 17.2% 197
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 15.3% 17.5% 165 14.1% 213
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 18.4% 17.9% 129 -2.9% 303
Kansas Kansas City, MO-KS 16.0% 18.7% 84 16.9% 198
Lawrence, KS 10.7% 18.7% 84 74.9% 74
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St. Joseph, MO-KS 17.6% 18.1% 112 3.1% 270
Topeka, KS 14.1% 18.3% 104 29.4% 161
Wichita, KS 17.7% 17.8% 141 0.1% 286
Kentucky Bowling Green, KY 22.3% 15.8% 299 -29.0% 374
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 16.1% 17.4% 182 8.2% 246
Clarksville, TN-KY 20.1% 17.1% 205 -14.9% 344
Elizabethtown, KY 15.9% 17.5% 165 10.5% 234
Evansville, IN-KY 21.0% 17.6% 152 -15.8% 346
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 15.1% 16.3% 277 8.0% 249
Lexington-Fayette, KY 13.5% 19.6% 51 44.8% 126
Louisville-Jefferson County, KY-IN 16.3% 18.5% 90 13.9% 215
Owensboro, KY 15.9% 16.8% 238 5.9% 259
Louisiana* Alexandria, LA 18.8% 15.1% 332 -19.9% 356
Baton Rouge, LA 17.4% 18.5% 90 6.4% 257
Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA 16.8% 16.0% 293 -4.9% 310
Lafayette, LA 14.9% 16.8% 238 13.0% 222
Lake Charles, LA 16.8% 14.6% 345 -13.2% 337
Monroe, LA 13.5% 15.4% 321 13.7% 216
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 14.7% 21.6% 19 47.1% 124
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 17.8% 17.3% 192 -3.1% 304
Maine Bangor, ME 17.1% 13.3% 362 -22.5% 361
Lewiston-Auburn, ME 13.6% 13.5% 360 -0.9% 291
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 6.8% 17.8% 141 159.8% 40
Maryland Baltimore-Towson, MD 12.8% 19.3% 60 50.5% 116
Bethesda-Gaithersburg-Frederick, MD 5.1% 20.4% 34 297.4% 17
Cumberland, MD-WV 12.4% 10.9% 375 -12.0% 333
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV 12.4% 20.6% 30 66.5% 91
Salisbury, MD 17.7% 14.7% 343 -16.6% 349
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 10.9% 14.1% 353 28.7% 165
Massachusetts Barnstable Town, MA 4.8% 19.9% 46 313.0% 15
Boston-Quincy, MA 5.2% 18.5% 90 257.9% 23
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 4.2% 16.5% 258 291.0% 18
Essex County, MA 4.3% 16.9% 230 289.1% 19
Pittsfield, MA 12.7% 12.0% 368 -5.5% 314
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 6.7% 19.5% 57 190.8% 34
Springfield, MA 15.1% 15.4% 321 1.6% 279
Worcester, MA 6.1% 17.3% 192 181.1% 37
Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 9.7% 19.6% 51 101.8% 57
Battle Creek, MI 15.5% 19.2% 63 23.6% 181
Bay City, MI 16.4% 18.9% 75 15.3% 206
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 16.9% 17.8% 141 5.4% 261
Flint, MI 18.9% 19.7% 47 4.3% 264
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 14.2% 17.8% 141 25.5% 175
Holland-Grand Haven, MI 11.4% 19.2% 63 67.8% 85
Jackson, MI 15.9% 20.0% 45 25.9% 173
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 15.2% 17.5% 165 15.0% 209
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 13.5% 20.6% 30 51.8% 114
Monroe, MI 12.4% 20.2% 40 62.6% 96
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI 18.8% 17.4% 182 -7.4% 319
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 15.8% 15.7% 307 -0.7% 290
State MSA
Rank
2006
Change
1998-2001
to 2006
Rank by
Change
from 1998-
2001 to
2006
1998-2001
Loans
2006
Loans
Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners52
State MSA
Rank
2006
Change
1998-2001
to 2006
Rank by
Change
from 1998-
2001 to
2006
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 17.4% 22.0% 15 26.7% 172
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 20.5% 16.7% 250 -18.8% 352
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 10.5% 17.5% 165 66.3% 92
Minnesota Duluth, MN-WI 12.9% 16.2% 283 25.8% 174
Fargo, ND-MN 10.6% 17.9% 129 68.5% 83
Grand Forks, ND-MN 13.6% 17.5% 165 29.1% 162
La Crosse, WI-MN 18.6% 18.9% 75 1.9% 277
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 10.0% 20.2% 40 100.6% 58
Rochester, MN 11.2% 18.3% 104 63.1% 95
St. Cloud, MN 12.4% 18.4% 97 48.0% 121
Mississippi* Gulfport-Biloxi, MS 17.8% 20.2% 40 13.4% 219
Hattiesburg, MS 15.4% 16.4% 267 6.4% 258
Jackson, MS 19.2% 18.0% 122 -6.2% 318
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 18.9% 17.9% 129 -5.1% 312
Pascagoula, MS 17.2% 18.0% 122 5.1% 262
Missouri Columbia, MO 17.6% 18.1% 112 3.2% 269
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 14.5% 18.4% 97 27.0% 170
Jefferson City, MO 17.3% 16.8% 238 -3.3% 306
Joplin, MO 21.8% 17.5% 165 -19.6% 354
Kansas City, MO-KS 16.0% 18.7% 84 16.9% 198
Springfield, MO 20.6% 17.1% 205 -16.6% 348
St. Joseph, MO-KS 17.6% 18.1% 112 3.1% 270
St. Louis, MO-IL 17.4% 17.5% 165 0.5% 283
Montana Billings, MT 11.4% 17.4% 182 53.2% 109
Great Falls, MT 12.9% 16.1% 287 24.7% 178
Missoula, MT 11.0% 17.1% 205 55.9% 106
Nebraska Lincoln, NE 14.0% 18.7% 84 33.0% 151
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 15.3% 17.5% 165 14.1% 213
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 20.2% 17.4% 182 -13.9% 342
Nevada Carson City, NV 5.6% 22.5% 12 298.5% 16
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 14.2% 23.7% 4 66.7% 89
Reno-Sparks, NV 6.1% 23.2% 8 279.8% 21
New Hampshire Manchester-Nashua, NH 4.9% 14.3% 351 192.1% 33
Rockingham County-Strafford County, NH 4.7% 15.6% 310 234.2% 26
New Jersey Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 12.2% 20.4% 34 66.8% 88
Atlantic City, NJ 10.0% 22.2% 13 122.0% 49
Camden, NJ 9.8% 16.8% 238 71.7% 79
Edison, NJ 6.5% 21.4% 21 230.9% 27
White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 8.7% 21.7% 18 148.4% 44
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 10.5% 18.3% 104 73.5% 77
Ocean City, NJ 7.8% 23.5% 5 202.1% 32
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 11.6% 15.3% 325 31.7% 153
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 13.0% 15.2% 329 16.6% 200
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 10.9% 14.1% 353 28.7% 165
New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 15.2% 17.3% 192 13.3% 220
Farmington, NM 10.9% 17.0% 222 55.6% 107
Las Cruces, NM 10.4% 16.9% 230 61.8% 97
Santa Fe, NM 9.7% 17.3% 192 77.4% 70
New York Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 13.5% 17.4% 182 28.5% 166
Binghamton, NY 13.1% 15.7% 307 19.7% 190
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Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 17.5% 15.6% 310 -11.0% 328
Elmira, NY 17.9% 15.5% 315 -13.4% 339
Glens Falls, NY 12.3% 11.6% 371 -5.6% 315
Ithaca, NY 11.6% 17.8% 141 52.8% 111
Kingston, NY 9.2% 17.5% 165 89.6% 63
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 7.2% 22.0% 15 204.4% 31
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 8.7% 21.7% 18 148.4% 44
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 8.1% 17.1% 205 111.2% 54
Rochester, NY 16.5% 16.9% 230 2.3% 275
Syracuse, NY 15.3% 16.4% 267 7.1% 253
Utica-Rome, NY 15.5% 14.6% 345 -5.6% 316
North Carolina Asheville, NC 12.5% 17.6% 152 41.4% 135
Burlington, NC 12.1% 17.1% 205 41.6% 134
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 15.3% 18.4% 97 20.1% 188
Durham, NC 13.2% 16.8% 238 27.3% 168
Fayetteville, NC 17.7% 15.5% 315 -12.5% 334
Goldsboro, NC 14.1% 15.5% 315 9.7% 238
Greensboro-High Point, NC 14.1% 17.5% 165 23.8% 180
Greenville, NC 13.5% 16.1% 287 18.9% 192
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 16.5% 17.6% 152 7.1% 254
Jacksonville, NC 10.6% 15.7% 307 48.1% 120
Raleigh-Cary, NC 14.1% 17.3% 192 22.8% 185
Rocky Mount, NC 16.2% 16.3% 277 0.4% 284
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 13.0% 18.0% 122 38.8% 139
Wilmington, NC 15.3% 16.8% 238 9.9% 235
Winston-Salem, NC 14.8% 16.9% 230 14.0% 214
North Dakota Bismarck, ND 11.9% 17.5% 165 47.5% 123
Fargo, ND-MN 10.6% 17.9% 129 68.5% 83
Grand Forks, ND-MN 13.6% 17.5% 165 29.1% 162
Ohio Akron, OH 17.6% 17.3% 192 -1.7% 295
Canton-Massillon, OH 17.5% 17.1% 205 -2.2% 300
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 15.6% 17.0% 222 9.3% 239
Columbus, OH 15.8% 17.6% 152 11.5% 228
Dayton, OH 18.8% 17.8% 141 -5.4% 313
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 15.1% 16.3% 277 8.0% 249
Lima, OH 22.9% 17.5% 165 -23.3% 362
Mansfield, OH 16.4% 18.4% 97 12.1% 226
Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV-OH 13.3% 15.3% 325 15.1% 208
Sandusky, OH 17.0% 15.3% 325 -10.1% 326
Springfield, OH 19.8% 17.3% 192 -12.8% 335
Toledo, OH 16.9% 18.1% 112 7.6% 251
Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH 14.6% 18.3% 104 24.8% 177
Wheeling, WV-OH 16.6% 16.1% 287 -3.2% 305
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 17.6% 16.2% 283 -8.1% 322
Oklahoma Fort Smith, AR-OK 21.5% 15.8% 299 -26.2% 367
Lawton, OK 26.7% 16.8% 238 -37.1% 378
Oklahoma City, OK 16.1% 18.3% 104 13.7% 217
Tulsa, OK 18.2% 17.3% 192 -4.9% 311
Oregon Bend, OR 8.7% 14.8% 339 71.1% 80
Corvallis, OR 16.2% 16.2% 283 0.0% 287
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Eugene-Springfield, OR 16.2% 18.8% 80 15.7% 204
Medford, OR 7.6% 19.2% 63 151.0% 43
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 14.9% 20.4% 34 36.7% 146
Salem, OR 16.9% 18.5% 90 9.8% 237
Pennsylvania Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 12.2% 20.4% 34 66.8% 88
Altoona, PA 9.2% 16.0% 293 74.0% 75
Erie, PA 9.3% 15.5% 315 67.0% 87
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 12.6% 18.1% 112 43.8% 129
Johnstown, PA 12.2% 15.1% 332 23.5% 183
Lancaster, PA 11.1% 19.3% 60 73.6% 76
Lebanon, PA 12.3% 17.8% 141 44.3% 128
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 10.5% 18.3% 104 73.5% 77
Philadelphia, PA 10.1% 16.7% 250 65.3% 93
Pittsburgh, PA 11.8% 16.3% 277 38.4% 142
Reading, PA 14.7% 19.1% 69 30.1% 156
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 12.7% 16.4% 267 29.5% 159
State College, PA 9.0% 16.8% 238 86.4% 67
Williamsport, PA 14.7% 14.5% 347 -1.3% 293
York-Hanover, PA 11.4% 19.1% 69 66.6% 90
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 17.6% 16.2% 283 -8.1% 322
Rhode Island Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 6.7% 19.5% 57 190.8% 34
South Carolina Anderson, SC 23.0% 17.9% 129 -22.3% 360
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 17.0% 16.7% 250 -1.9% 297
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 10.9% 18.3% 104 68.0% 84
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 15.3% 18.4% 97 20.1% 188
Columbia, SC 15.1% 17.50% 165 16.2% 201
Florence, SC 16.2% 16.7% 250 2.7% 273
Greenville, SC 17.9% 17.8% 141 -0.6% 289
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC 12.8% 12.7% 366 -0.9% 292
Spartanburg, SC 19.7% 18.5% 90 -5.8% 317
Sumter, SC 19.6% 17.3% 192 -11.9% 331
South Dakota Rapid City, SD 8.8% 18.0% 122 104.5% 56
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD 20.2% 17.4% 182 -13.9% 342
Sioux Falls, SD 13.6% 18.9% 75 39.0% 138
Tennessee Chattanooga, TN-GA 17.4% 18.1% 112 4.2% 265
Clarksville, TN-KY 20.1% 17.1% 205 -14.9% 344
Cleveland, TN 18.6% 17.1% 205 -7.7% 320
Jackson, TN 16.7% 16.3% 277 -2.1% 298
Johnson City, TN 15.5% 17.5% 165 13.3% 221
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA 17.4% 17.9% 129 2.9% 271
Knoxville, TN 16.2% 19.1% 69 17.9% 194
Morristown, TN 17.2% 16.5% 258 -3.8% 309
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro, TN 15.4% 17.0% 222 10.6% 232
Texas Abilene, TX 21.9% 16.0% 293 -27.0% 369
Amarillo, TX 13.9% 17.8% 141 27.7% 167
Austin-Round Rock, TX 10.8% 17.0% 222 58.2% 100
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 17.1% 17.9% 129 4.7% 263
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 12.5% 12.5% 367 0.2% 285
College Station-Bryan, TX 13.1% 15.2% 329 15.9% 202
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Corpus Christi, TX 10.9% 16.4% 267 50.9% 115
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 12.8% 16.9% 230 32.2% 152
El Paso, TX 10.7% 15.8% 299 48.3% 119
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 13.6% 16.8% 238 23.2% 184
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 12.6% 17.6% 152 39.8% 137
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 13.0% 15.8% 299 21.6% 187
Laredo, TX 11.9% 13.0% 365 8.9% 242
Longview, TX 11.3% 14.8% 339 31.5% 155
Lubbock, TX 10.4% 16.4% 267 57.3% 102
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 13.7% 11.6% 371 -15.3% 345
Midland, TX 14.2% 16.4% 267 15.9% 203
Odessa, TX 18.1% 16.4% 267 -9.4% 324
San Angelo, TX 19.3% 16.4% 267 -14.7% 343
San Antonio, TX 13.5% 17.4% 182 29.0% 163
Sherman-Denison, TX 14.3% 16.5% 258 15.4% 205
Tyler, TX 13.2% 16.1% 287 22.1% 186
Victoria, TX 16.4% 13.3% 362 -18.9% 353
Waco, TX 14.3% 17.1% 205 19.8% 189
Wichita Falls, TX 17.7% 15.6% 310 -12.0% 332
Utah Logan, UT-ID 16.9% 17.1% 205 1.4% 280
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 22.9% 17.9% 129 -22.0% 359
Provo-Orem, UT 16.5% 18.4% 97 11.6% 227
Salt Lake City, UT 19.0% 17.4% 182 -8.3% 323
St. George, UT 20.0% 19.7% 47 -1.3% 294
Vermont Burlington-South Burlington, VT 8.0% 15.1% 332 87.8% 65
Virginia Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA 12.0% 17.0% 222 42.4% 130
Charlottesville, VA 5.6% 18.1% 112 223.1% 30
Danville, VA 17.2% 17.5% 165 2.0% 276
Harrisonburg, VA 13.5% 18.1% 112 34.8% 149
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA 17.4% 17.9% 129 2.9% 271
Lynchburg, VA 12.7% 17.3% 192 35.7% 147
Richmond, VA 11.6% 20.2% 40 73.0% 78
Roanoke, VA 14.4% 16.5% 258 14.8% 211
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 13.0% 18.0% 122 38.8% 139
Winchester, VA-WV 8.0% 17.1% 205 115.1% 52
Washington Bellingham, WA 15.1% 14.7% 343 -2.2% 299
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA 12.8% 16.5% 258 29.4% 160
Kennewick-Richland-Pasco, WA 11.4% 14.8% 339 29.9% 158
Lewiston, ID-WA 23.3% 19.6% 51 -16.0% 347
Longview, WA 21.1% 13.7% 358 -35.2% 376
Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 15.6% 13.9% 357 -11.1% 329
Olympia, WA 14.2% 15.5% 315 9.1% 241
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 14.9% 20.4% 34 36.7% 146
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 11.0% 16.8% 238 52.0% 112
Spokane, WA 19.1% 17.3% 192 -9.5% 325
Tacoma, WA 17.0% 16.5% 258 -2.7% 302
Wenatchee, WA 14.4% 11.3% 374 -21.3% 358
Yakima, WA 16.8% 12.0% 368 -28.2% 372
West Virginia Charleston, WV 13.9% 15.1% 332 7.90% 250
Cumberland, MD-WV 12.4% 10.9% 375 -12.0% 333
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Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV 12.4% 20.6% 30 66.5% 91
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 15.1% 16.3% 277 8.0% 249
Morgantown, WV 15.4% 14.9% 337 -3.3% 307
Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna, WV-OH 13.3% 15.3% 325 15.1% 20
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 8.2% 22.8% 9 177.9% 38
Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH 14.60 18.3% 104 24.8% 177
Wheeling, WV-OH 16.6% 16.1% 287 -3.2% 305
Winchester, VA-WV 8.0% 17.1% 205 115.1% 52
Wisconsin Appleton, WI 12.9% 17.8% 141 37.3% 143
Duluth, MN-WI 12.9% 16.2% 283 25.8% 174
Eau Claire, WI 15.5% 18.4% 97 18.9% 193
Fond du Lac, WI 13.3% 18.1% 112 36.9% 145
Green Bay, WI 12.0% 17.0% 222 41.8% 133
Janesville, WI 17.2% 19.1% 69 10.6% 233
La Crosse, WI-MN 18.6% 18.9% 75 1.9% 277
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI 11.3% 19.2% 63 70.6% 81
Madison, WI 12.7% 19.7% 47 55.9% 105
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 13.5% 20.4% 34 51.8% 113
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 10.0% 20.2% 40 100.6% 58
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 14.3% 17.9% 129 25.1% 176
Racine, WI 14.1% 19.5% 57 38.4% 141
Sheboygan, WI 12.2% 18.3% 104 49.8% 117
Wausau, WI 14.8% 17.6% 152 19.0% 191
Wyoming Casper, WY 9.6% 17.3% 192 79.30 69
Cheyenne, WY 8.8% 17.6% 152 100.3% 59
* Our models do not account for the potential impact of Hurricane Katrina on foreclosure rates.
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